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Executive Summary 
The global financial crisis is expected to have a major impact on low-income countries 
(LICs), especially in sub-Saharan Africa—and urgent action is required by LIC policymakers 
and the international community. The crisis is projected to increase the financing needs of 
LICs by at least US$25 billion in 2009, and much larger needs are possible. Twenty-six LICs 
appear particularly vulnerable to the unfolding crisis. Additional external assistance and 
foreign financing will be essential to mitigate the impact of the crisis on LICs. The Fund is 
deploying its own financing facilities for LICs, while making efforts to sustain and catalyze 
additional assistance from other institutions and donors. Fund financing to LICs has already 
increased significantly; new financing arrangements jumped from 5 in 2007 to 23 in 2008, 
representing an increase in total (GRA and PRGF/ESF) disbursements from US$0.6 billion 
to US$5.4 billion. The Fund has also launched a broad examination of its LIC facilities and 
financing framework to ensure its financial assistance meets the diverse needs of its low-
income members. 
The global economy is in the midst of a deep downturn, affecting the real and financial 
sectors, that is taking its toll both in advanced and in emerging and developing countries. All 
major advanced economies are in recession, while activity in emerging and developing 
economies is slowing abruptly.  
LICs are exposed to the current global downturn more than in previous episodes, as they are 
more integrated than before with the world economy through trade, FDI, and remittances. 
The crisis significantly impacts these countries through reduced demand for their exports. 
Since many are commodity exporters, they will be hard hit by the sharp decline in demand 
for commodities and in their prices. Many LICs are also hit by lower remittances and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) while aid flows are under threat. Growth of remittances was flat in 
the second half of 2008, and is expected to be negative in 2009. A sharp slowdown in FDI is 
expected in about half of all LICs. Prospects for higher aid to offset these effects are 
particularly uncertain, given budgetary pressures faced by many donor countries. 
LICs’ financial systems have so far not been strongly affected by the global crisis. Their
banks have little, if any, exposure to complex financial instruments. However, those LICs 
that had begun to access international financial markets have seen this access come virtually 
to an end.  Foreign lenders may become more reluctant or unable to roll over sovereign and 
private debt falling due. Domestic banks may be hit by second-round effects, as the economic 
downturn increases the number of borrowers unable to repay their loans. 
The global financial crisis will worsen the budgetary position of many LIC governments.
Government revenues are expected to suffer as economic activity slows and commodity 
prices fall. Potential declines in donor support and tighter financing conditions will likely 
impose further pressures on LICs’ budgets. At the same time, many countries will need to 
increase spending to protect the poor, and additional spending pressures may arise from 
currency depreciation and rising interest rates, which could raise debt service costs.   
viii 
There is a risk that the impact on LICs could be more serious—26 countries appear 
particularly vulnerable to the unfolding crisis. These include countries heavily dependent on 
commodity exports, such as oil exporters, as well as fragile states with little room for 
maneuver. Baseline projections for 2009 foresee a total balance of payments shock of 
US$165 billion. They also suggest that LICs may need at least US$25 billion to offset the 
impact of the shock on their international reserves; given the heavy downside risks to the 
forecast, the needs could be much larger—approaching US$140 billion in a “bad case” 
scenario.   
Countries in initially strong budget positions may have some scope to accommodate the 
cyclical fiscal deterioration and, in some cases, to increase spending to cushion the impact of 
the crisis. These are countries without public debt sustainability and financing constraints 
that have achieved macroeconomic stability. Commodity producers that built up financial 
cushions during the boom may be able to maintain spending or adjust gradually.  
In many LICs, however, the ability to offset adverse shocks through spending hinges on 
higher donor support. With many countries facing binding fiscal constraints, and the outlook 
for significantly increased bilateral aid flows unlikely, many countries will need to 
rationalize spending and increase its efficiency to create fiscal space for protecting social and 
MDG-related spending. Efforts will also be required to strengthen revenue mobilization.  
Given the economic downturn, efforts to strengthen safety net programs to protect the poor 
become more urgent. Transfer programs that effectively target the poorest often result in a 
larger stimulus to aggregate demand, given their higher propensity to consume. The capacity 
of many LICs to put in place new targeted programs will be limited in the near term. There 
may be scope, however, to scale up existing spending programs in targeted ways. For 
example, countries can implement public works programs and/or provide income 
supplements through existing programs. Additional resources can be channeled to targeted 
programs, such as targeted food distribution or school meal programs.
Countries should focus on macroeconomic stability. In some countries with falling inflation 
there may be scope for monetary easing; others, however, still experience continued or 
renewed price pressures. Those with flexible exchange rates should allow them to move, so 
that they function as shock absorbers. Fixed exchange rate regimes may come under 
particular pressure owing to the adverse direct impact of the crisis. Steps are also needed to 
prevent the global financial crisis from spreading to their domestic financial sectors.   
The Fund is assisting members in their crisis planning and response efforts and will continue 
to adapt its financial toolkit and policies to better serve its low-income members. The Fund 
will provide financial support to LICs that responds to their economic circumstances, the 
nature of the balance of payments problem, and their existing program relationship, if any, 
with the Fund. LICs’ demand for Fund financing has already increased in 2008 and will 
likely increase further, as will technical assistance needs. 
1I.   Introduction  
The global financial crisis has spread rapidly since the fall of 2008, leading to a 
global downturn of uncertain severity and duration. The impact of financial sector turmoil on 
real activity has become increasingly evident, propagating beyond its initial epicenters to 
affect other advanced economies, emerging markets, and LICs.  
This paper analyzes the impact of the global financial crisis on LICs.1 It provides an 
overview of the possible impact of the crisis on the short-term macroeconomic outlook. To 
assess the magnitude of the effects, the paper compares current (January 2009) projections 
with those made before the crisis. In addition, simulations illustrate the heavy downside risks 
to these projections.
While for many LICs the effects of the crisis have lagged the rest of the world, its 
eventual impact may be severe, especially given their often limited scope for countercyclical 
policies. Many LICs have made great strides in strengthening their policy frameworks and 
robustness to shocks, reducing poverty, and reforming their financial systems. But many 
remain highly vulnerable to a deep global downturn that so closely follows the 2007/08 food 
and fuel price shocks. Financial market linkages are generally weak, but second-round effects 
of the economic slowdown on the financial system could be particularly severe. Without 
additional aid, the scope for countercyclical policies is limited for most LICs due to binding 
financing constraints and fragile debt positions. This could both deepen and prolong the crisis 
in LICs, and set back the fight against poverty.  
Against this background, the paper provides policy advice on how best to address the 
impact of the crisis on LICs and describes the Fund support. The Fund assists countries in 
designing policies to support growth and mitigate risks to the financial system. The Fund is 
also deploying its own financing facilities for LICs, while making efforts to sustain and 
catalyze additional assistance from other institutions and donors.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses the outlook for global 
economic growth and commodity prices, while Section III provides an overview of the 
changes in economic projections associated with the crisis. The various financial channels 
and spillovers from the global downturn are discussed in Section IV. Section V analyzes the 
fiscal and debt sustainability implications of the crisis. Country vulnerabilities are 
investigated in Section VI. Policy recommendations to help countries weather the crisis are 
considered in Section VII, with LICs’ potential additional financing needs assessed in 
Section VIII. Finally, Section IX concludes with a review of ways in which the Fund can 
assist its LIC membership. 
1Generally, references to LICs in Fund documents relate to all 78 PRGF-eligible countries. However, because of 
data limitations, and unless indicated otherwise, data for LICs reported in this paper refer to the more limited set 
of 71 countries listed in Appendix I. 
2II.   Outlook for Global Growth and Commodity Prices 
The global economy is in the midst of a deep downturn as an adverse feedback loop between 
the real and financial sectors is taking its toll both in advanced and in emerging and 
developing countries. As a result, commodity prices are unlikely to recover in the short run. 
All major advanced economies are in 
recession, while activity in emerging and 
developing economies is slowing abruptly. 
Continued deleveraging by the financial sector 
and dramatic declines in consumer and 
business confidence have triggered a sharp 
deceleration in domestic demand across the 
globe. World trade and industrial activity are 
falling sharply, while labor markets are 
weakening at a rapid pace, particularly in the 
United States. The decline in commodity prices is providing some support to commodity 
importers, but is weighing heavily on growth in commodity exporters. 
Global growth is set to weaken 
considerably. Activity is expected to 
decelerate from 3½ percent in 2008 to ½ 
percent in 2009 before embarking on a gradual 
recovery in 2010.2
The advanced economies as a group 
are facing their sharpest post-war contraction. 
The euro area and Japan have been hard hit by 
the decline in external demand, while 
uncertainty about the course of the economy is dampening consumption and business 
investment in the United States. Activity in these countries is now expected to contract by 2 
percent in 2009, followed by a modest rebound in 2010.  
Growth in emerging and developing economies is also slowing sharply. Financing 
constraints, lower commodity prices, weak external demand, and associated spillovers to 
domestic demand are expected to weigh on activity. As a result, growth is projected at 3¼ 
percent in 2009—a markdown of 3¼ percentage points compared with the April 2008 WEO 
and less than half the pace in 2007—before rebounding to around 5 percent in 2010.  
2In line with WEO conventions, data reported in this section are country averages weighted by GDP valued at 
PPPs, and may differ from averages mentioned in other parts of the paper. 
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3? Countries in central and eastern 
Europe and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States have been hit 
particularly hard by capital flow 
reversals and, in some countries, 
falling commodity prices. Activity is 
expected to contract by ½ percent in 
2009.
? Commodity exporters, particularly  
in Latin America, Africa, and the 
Middle East, face a sharp decline in commodity prices, putting pressure on  
external accounts and government finances. In Latin America, growth is also 
constrained by weaker external demand (notably from the United States) and  
tighter financial conditions, and is expected to slow from 4½ percent in 2008 to  
1 percent in 2009.
? For countries in emerging Asia—including China—terms of trade improvements 
from falling commodity prices and macroeconomic policy easing will not prevent a 
significant slowdown as export demand weakens and investment is cut back.  
Overall, growth in this region would decline from 7¾ percent in 2008 to 5½ percent 
in 2009. 
With growth well below trend in emerging and developing economies, commodity 
prices have collapsed over the past few months. Expectations of resilience in these 
economics had underpinned commodity prices for much of 2008, but hopes for “decoupling” 
have since evaporated. Commodity prices tend to be significantly cyclical, as output 
contraction in commodity-intensive sectors exceeds that in other sectors.  
Financial turmoil and U.S. dollar appreciation have exacerbated the downward  
price momentum. Investors have sought to reduce their holdings of commodity assets,  
given increasing concerns about counterparty risks (many standard commodity  
investment instruments such as total return swaps involve such risks), decreasing  
availability of credit for leveraged commodity market exposure (e.g., by hedge funds), a 
rising preference for liquidity, and sizable recent appreciation of the U.S. dollar in nominal 
effective terms.  
Commodity prices are unlikely to recover while global activity is slowing. 
? OPEC production cuts could eventually help to support oil prices if implemented 
close to target, as scope for increased production elsewhere seems limited. 
Nevertheless, still softening demand and rising inventories will continue to weigh on 
the market in the short term. 
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? Near-term metals price prospects depend 
on construction and investment demand 
in key emerging and developing 
economies.
? Food prices are likely to be less affected 
by the slowdown since food demand is 
less income-elastic than other 
commodities. Lower prices for energy 
inputs will likely lead to some further  
easing of prices, although the high fuel  
and fertilizer prices through mid-2008 
may weigh on supply in 2009.  
Lower commodity prices and increasing 
economic slack will help to contain inflation 
pressures. In the advanced economies, headline 
inflation should decline to below ¼ percent by 
the end of 2009, and deflation risks are 
becoming an increasing concern in some 
countries. In emerging and developing 
economies inflation is also expected to moderate.  
III.   How Are LICs Affected? An Overview 
The global financial crisis is expected to have a severe impact on growth and external 
stability in many LICs. At the same time, inflationary pressures are receding in most 
countries. The crisis follows the commodity price shocks of 2007–08, putting at risk an 
extended period of improved macroeconomic policies and performance through mid-2007 
(See Box 1). 
Going into the global financial crisis, the balance of payments of many LICs had 
already been severely weakened by the 2007–08 spike in global fuel and food prices. 
Between January 2007 and July 2008, LICs faced a food price shock, which peaked in mid-
2008, of almost 1 percent of GDP, and a fuel price shock averaging almost 3½ percent of 
GDP. As a result, some 33 out of a group of 78 LICs were identified as particularly 
vulnerable, with reserve cover falling below 3 months of imports.3
3IMF (2008a). 
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The current crisis is expected to have serious adverse effects on LICs, albeit with a 
lag relative to the impact on more advanced economies. To date, many LICs have seemed 
fairly resilient to financial crisis, reflecting the still limited nature of cross-border linkages in 
their banking systems. However, the picture is expected to worsen as the lagged effects on 
real activity around the world feed through to LICs. In this context, the fact that domestic 
rather than export-driven agriculture accounts for a large share of the economy in many 
countries (particularly in Africa) might help attenuate somewhat the impact of the crisis.  
The emerging macroeconomic pressures are evident from the sharp changes in the 
economic projections for 2009 (Figure 1, and Appendix II). These revisions—which remain 
subject to much uncertainty, with risks mainly on the downside—reflect both direct financial 
effects of the crisis and the repercussions of global economic downturn.  
? Growth projections for 2009 have been revised down since the spring of 2008, from 
6.4 percent to 4.3 percent, on average.  
? Trade balance and current account projections are shaped by the collapse of 
commodity prices, and the anticipated adverse effects of the crisis on LIC exports and 
remittance inflows. While the net effect could be benign for some net food and fuel 
importers, the impact is decidedly negative for commodity exporters. 
? Financial inflows are subject to large downside risks. For many LICs, current 
projections show a clear adverse effect of the crisis on inflows of foreign financial 
and direct investment, and on aid.  
? Reflecting the above, projected 
reserves accumulation by LICs in 
2009 has declined significantly 
since the April 2008 WEO, with 
reserves now projected to fall from 
4.4 to 4.2 months of imports in 
2009, on average, compared with 
previous projections of an increase 
of 0.3 month. 
? Inflation is expected to drop 
sharply in 2009 from the peaks seen in 2008. Following the food and fuel price 
shocks, inflation spiked upwards in 2008, rising in many LICs to more than 20 
percent. With the recent declines in food and fuel prices, these initial pressures are 
receding. Falling demand in the wake of the global crisis will help lower inflation 
further. The latest projections show median inflation declining from 11¼ percent in 
2008 to 7¾ percent in 2009—which remains above earlier projections.  
6Box 1. The Pre-Crisis Recovery
In many LICs, the years leading up to 2007 witnessed a strong recovery in growth, while long-standing 
challenges of high inflation and high debt were also successfully tackled. Fiscal and current account deficits 
were put on a downward path (except to reflect the spending of stepped up aid), and international reserves were 
raised to their highest level in decades (Appendix II, Figure 1). All of this was accomplished, in varying degrees, 
through a combination of better macroeconomic policies, higher aid, debt relief, and the support of more 
conducive global economic conditions (including better terms of trade).    
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
1. Emerging and developing countries.
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The improvement in macroeconomic conditions was fairly broad-based, but particularly strong for African 
countries, debt relief recipients, and (more recently) net oil exporters. African countries saw their growth rates 
almost double between the 1990s and the 2000-07 period (Appendix II, Figure 2). In recent years, net oil 
exporters saw sharp improvements in macroeconomic conditions alongside large terms of trade gains.
However, the increased openness that has contributed to the improved performance has also increased 
exposure to external shocks. The accumulated macroeconomic gains will assist LICs in withstanding economic 
shocks: higher reserves permit countries to address temporary financing shortfalls, while lower initial deficits 
and debt create fiscal space for countercyclical policy. At the same time, increased trade and financial links with 
the outside world also imply greater dependence on external conditions: exports now amount to more than a 
third of GDP in LICs (from just 10 percent in 1990); FDI is close to 5 percent of GDP, a roughly five-fold 
increase from 1990; and several LICs have gained access to financing on international markets (see Section IV). 
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The overall fiscal balances of 
LICs are projected to deteriorate on 
average by about 2½ percentage points 
of GDP in 2009. The outlook varies 
substantially across countries. 
Commodity exporters are expected to 
experience some of the largest negative 
shifts in fiscal positions—by 5 
8percentage points of GDP, on average—due to significant revenue declines.4 The balances of 
non-commodity exporters are expected to deteriorate on average by close to 1 percentage 
point of GDP, mainly due to their maintaining spending in the face of lower growth and 
revenues.5
The global financial crisis could—in principle—lead to large exchange rate 
adjustments in LICs, but a number of attenuating factors may work to limit prospective 
depreciations. First, almost two-thirds of LICs have fixed exchange rate regimes (including 
countries with de facto pegs), shifting the burden of external adjustment onto fiscal and 
monetary policies. Second, import demand will tend to drop, not only as a result of slower 
growth but also because some declining inflows (such as FDI) have a heavy import 
“content.” And, third, import bills will shrink as a result of lower food and fuel prices. 
IV.   The Impact of the Crisis: The Channels  
The direct impact of the global financial crisis on LICs will be stronger for countries with a 
higher degree of financial integration. For most, this channel has played a limited role so 
far, though strains are starting to appear. But, the slowdown in global growth will reduce 
trade, remittances, foreign direct investment, and, possibly, aid, and these factors will have a 
major impact on LICs, including second-round effects on the financial sector. 
Direct Financial Channels 
Structures and financial system conditions vary vastly across the LICs. Despite 
several initiatives for financial sector reform over the past decade, entry of foreign financial 
institutions, and the emergence of private external creditors and investors, the breadth, 
diversification, and competitiveness of LICs’ financial systems remain shallow and 
distortionary. Most have small derivatives and interbank markets, low level of reliance on 
international capital, and regulatory barriers constraining new financial products and market 
entry by new institutions.  
As a consequence, thus far, the direct financial transmission of the global crisis 
appears to have been relatively limited. However, emerging signs that the crisis is spreading 
to LICs are evident, in particular, for those that had begun to access international capital 
markets (for example, Ghana and Sri Lanka), or where direct and indirect foreign financing 
4Some oil producers like Angola, Azerbaijan, and the Republic of Congo may suffer less due to rising oil 
volumes. 
5This result is similar to the average projected deterioration in the fiscal balance of non-commodity exporters 
that are faced with below-trend growth, when the elasticities are assumed to be one for revenues and zero for 
expenditures and automatic stabilizers are allowed to work. 
9in local markets was on the rise (Kenya, Nigeria, Malawi, Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia). The 
global downturn and ongoing stress in the international credit markets are curtailing private 
capital inflows in a number of LICs (e.g. Uganda and Zambia) and the operations of foreign 
banks in the local markets, creating funding pressures in banking systems.6 LICs are 
experiencing outflows of capital, and there are initial pressures on foreign exchange markets 
and the yield curve. The financial crisis is also sharply reducing private sector credit, in  
part reflecting banks’ need to increase liquidity buffers given expected cuts in external  
credit lines. 
As the negative effects from a slowdown in the real sector gain ground, the pressures 
on financial systems are likely to rise. These second-round effects could affect the corporate 
sector, the balance sheets of banks, as well as the sovereign, placing further pressure on 
LICs’ ability to manage the fallout of the crisis. As domestic economic conditions 
deteriorate, the financial condition of the banks may deteriorate rapidly, as borrowers’ 
capacity to repay is impaired, and banks’ funding bases shrink. Also, exchange rate 
depreciation could expose some bank borrowers to exchange rate risk, or raise their costs of 
operation, with negative effects on loan recovery performance.  
Impact on Domestic Banks and Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
To date, the direct impact on LICs’ banking systems remains modest. The existence 
of capital controls in several countries and structural factors have helped to moderate both the 
direct and the indirect effects of the financial crisis:       
? Banking systems have little exposure, if any, to complex financial instruments. This
has resulted in fewer exposures and risks of potential losses;  
? Abundant low-cost domestic deposits and liquidity. This has allowed banks to finance 
themselves with domestic funds and thereby minimize wholesale leverage on their 
balance sheet. Many banks are highly liquid and, owing to weak competition, have 
high profit margins contributing to a buildup in capital buffers.  
That said, some erosion can be expected in the quality of banks’ asset portfolios as 
well as in their financial performance. In a number of countries, the financial soundness 
indicators published in the third quarter of 2008 show some weakening of nonperforming 
loan (NPL) ratios, reversing past trends. Although, on average, banks' profits remain high, 
intensifying bank competition to retain deposits is likely to reduce interest spreads 
(Cambodia, Mongolia, and Pakistan).7
6There is also evidence of portfolio inflow reversal and capital flight, even in countries with capital restrictions 
(e.g., Kenya, Tanzania, and Nigeria).          
7Fitch Rating Reports (November 2008). 
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Bu
rk
in
a 
Fa
so
2006 2008Q3 2006 2008Q3 2006 2008Q3 2006 2008Q3 2006 2008Q3
Armenia 34.9 27.2 3.6 2.9 15.9 13.1 2.5 3.9 51.5 35.1
Azerbaijan 18.7 17.7 1.3 2.2 9.9 18.7 6.6 2.3 … …
Cambodia 26.5 25.6 2.8 3.1 14.2 15.8 9.9 2.7 41.7 38.6
Ghana 15.8 15.4 4.8 3.6 39.6 31.5 7.9 8.7 46.3 39.1
India 12.4 12.7 0.9 1.0 … … 3.5 2.4 … …
Kenya 10.6 11.2 2.8 3.2 28.6 33.7 15.0 8.1 30.5 38.6
Kyrgyz Republic 28.5 30.8 3.4 3.8 23.2 20.4 6.2 4.1 77.8 81.0
Lesotho 19.0 15.0 2.0 2.4 27.0 31.7 2.0 3.5 … …
Moldova 27.9 30.8 3.4 4.1 20.5 23.3 4.4 4.6 33.5 31.4
Nigeria 22.6 22.0 1.6 2.4 10.4 13.9 8.8 6.1 32.5 31.0
Pakistan 12.7 13.4 2.1 2.0 23.8 20.6 6.9 7.4 31.9 34.0
Vietnam 6.6 7.4 1.5 1.5 … … 2.6 2.5 14.4 14.0
Zambia 20.4 17.0 5.1 5.0 30.6 36.6 11.3 6.0 41.3 32.8
Sources: National authorities, and Fund staff calculations.
1/ Regulatory capital to risk - weighted assets.
2/ Return on average assets.
3/ Return on average equity.
4/ Non-performing loans to gross loans.
5/ Ratio of liquid assets to total assets.
Note: Due to differences in national accounting, taxation and supervisory regimes, FSI data are not strictly
comparable across countries.   
Table 1. Selected Financial Soundness Indicators in LICs 
Liquidity ratio 5/CAR 1/ ROA 2/ ROE 3/ NPLs ratio 4/
Furthermore, prolonged liquidity pressure in domestic financial markets is beginning 
to have an impact on several LICs’ banking systems. Increasing interlinkages between banks 
and local capital markets as well as weaknesses in banks’ risk management have begun to 
expose banks to market volatility, particularly in countries where high equity returns had 
encouraged borrowing for investing in the stock market (Nigeria and Kenya). At the same 
time, as banks’ own share prices have fallen, their cost of capital has gone up, which will 
constrain their ability to grow.  
Given the prevalence of foreign-
owned banks, LICs may face difficulties 
from withdrawal of funds by their parent 
companies. Countries with licensed 
subsidiaries of foreign banks, rather than 
branches, may be better positioned to 
detect potential risks of capital 
withdrawal, as their local operators are 
subject to local supervision.8
8Among the typical channels through which such withdrawals take place are (i) subsidiaries asked to sell 
profitable loans in order to increase the capital-asset ratio on a consolidated basis; and (ii) shift in deposits from 
subsidiaries to headquarters. Where there is sufficient liquidity and foreign exchange availability, foreign banks 
have reduced their shareholding in foreign subsidiaries by selling to domestic investors.  
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2006 2007 2008Q3 2006 2007 2008Q3
Armenia 183.5 475.2 687.4 234.2 311.6 357.3
Azerbaijan 235.5 973.3 1,978.2 16.0 5.9 10.2
Chad 100.1 120.6 205.4 75.7 162.9 198.9
Honduras 609.4 749.9 775.5 … … …
Lesotho 10.5 10.8 5.5 … … …
Liberia 22.2 13.3 12.7 0.9 1.0 …
Madagascar 39.0 50.5 87.8 264.8 281.1 280.9
Mali 171.9 225.2 … … … …
Niger 50.3 69.0 90.6 0.1 0.1 0.1
Sri Lanka 941.4 960.7 1,003.9 … … …
Sources : National authorities, and IMF staff estimates.
Table 2. Deposit Money Banks' Exposure to Foreign Creditors in Selected LICs
(Millions of U.S. dollars) (Percent of liquid foreign assets)
Banks relying on foreign funding sources may also be subject to possible rollover 
risk. Lower availability of foreign capital due to tighter global liquidity conditions may 
hamper the ability of some banks to roll over maturing foreign exchange obligations. This 
situation may be worsened by tighter domestic financing in some LICs. It has also become 
increasingly difficult for many microfinance institutions to find foreign sources of funds. 
Some previously available foreign credit lines are now being cancelled.9
Impact on Financial Markets 
Access to International Markets and Costs of Financing 
Access to market-based international financing was opening up to LICs with  
strong fundamentals, but it now appears to be closing. Sovereign spreads have increased 
dramatically for these countries, reflecting investor liquidity needs and flight to higher 
quality assets (i.e., U.S. treasury bills) rather than a negative credit outlook—LICs’  
sovereign credit ratings generally remained stable or even improved during the second  
half of 2008.
9There have been fears that the failure of banks with liquidity/solvency issues at home would require closure of 
subsidiaries in low-income countries. In most cases, however, guarantees by the parent country governments of 
foreign banks have allayed these fears. The risk of sudden liquidity withdrawal is also generally attenuated by 
the low reliance on these markets by parent banks, as from a global point of view the funds involved are small. 
In some cases, foreign banks may prefer to leave their local interests untouched for strategic reasons, such as 
long-term prospects of the economy. The presence of exchange or capital controls also tends to limit such 
withdrawals. 
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Current market conditions have led several LICs to postpone their issuance plans 
(Albania, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia), and roll-over and liquidity risks are rising 
(See Box 2). 10 This could also lead to an intensifying liquidity squeeze, in particular for the 
corporate sector which accounts for the bulk of the upcoming maturities. Thus, the potential 
for rollover risk is high, and LICs’ capacity to meet financial obligations may be further 
affected by reduced domestic resources as the crisis impacts the real sector.
As global liquidity conditions have 
tightened over the past few months, trade 
financing has been adversely affected. The 
financial crisis has constrained access to trade 
financing (e.g., Lesotho, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka) and put upward pressure on costs. 
LICs’ volume of trade financing dropped by  
18 percent in the last quarter of 2008. 
10For an in-depth review of recent debt management issues in LICs see also joint IMF–World Bank Board paper 
on “Managing Public Debt: Formulating Strategies and Strengthening Institutional Capacity” March 2009 
(forthcoming). 
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Box 2. Private Capital Inflows to Local Currency Sovereign Debt Markets in LICs 
Market participants indicate that nonresidents’ exposure in local LIC markets is built not only through direct 
position taking, but also through offshore derivative contracts. In particular, nonresidents may engage in total 
return swaps with residents, which at an agreed future date will deliver the full return on the local LIC debt 
security to the nonresident in exchange for another income stream (often LIBOR plus a mark up). Given that the 
balance of payments does not necessarily record a capital flow related with such a transaction at the time of its 
ratification, policymakers face a large degree of uncertainty as to the magnitude of such exposures.  
Risks associated with sizable nonresident investments in LIC local debt markets are, however, qualitatively 
different from those encountered in more developed markets. Several characteristics of LICs and their debt 
markets render these countries particularly vulnerable when private external creditors suddenly run for the exit, 
regardless of whether foreign investors reduce their exposure directly or through the unwinding of derivative 
contracts with domestic institutions: (i) domestic local-currency debt typically involves very short maturities 
reflecting factors such as a high susceptibility to exogenous shocks, the lack of a strong macroeconomic track 
record, and the absence of credible mechanisms to index the debt instruments to inflation or GDP growth;  
(ii) there tends to be a bunching of maturities due to an underdeveloped yield curve and weaknesses in debt 
management; (iii) investment risk often remains concentrated within the domestic banking sector due to the lack 
of a broader investor base; and (iv) the monitoring of investor sentiment may be complicated by the fact that the 
illiquidity of many financial markets delays the transmission of a confidence shock to asset prices. 
Over time, adverse balance sheet effects could affect the sovereign’s solvency. As long as nonresidents remain 
invested in the country, the net loss of interest income for the central bank stemming from the large gap 
between interest rates on domestic sterilization bonds and those on its foreign assets would weaken the 
institution’s profitability over time. When investor sentiment drops and nonresidents sell their exposure, a 
prolonged period of high interest rates combined with the realization of contingent liabilities emanating from 
the dynamics discussed below could turn a sovereign liquidity crisis into a solvency crisis.
The spread for some trade financing widened in November 2008 to 500 bp over LIBOR from 
80 bp a year earlier.11 In trade transactions, customers are seeking longer repayment periods, 
while banks are requesting more difficult terms and conditions. 
Domestic Financial Markets 
Domestic financing conditions are also 
tightening in some LICs. Domestic interest 
rates have increased considerably in a number 
of LICs. The EMTA survey reports that, 
between Q2 and Q3 of 2008, trades of local 
debt by foreign investors had dropped 71  
percent in LICs, compared to only 22 percent 
for emerging market debt. 
11HSBC Global Research (November 2008).   
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Stock markets have similarly been impacted by the crisis. The Merrill Lynch Africa 
Lions Index, which tracks 15 African countries, declined by almost 70 percent during 
March–December 2008. Exchanges in other LICs have fallen considerably as well, reflecting 
a decline in corporate valuations, particularly in sectors that are vulnerable to the 
retrenchment in global economic conditions.12
12These are typically export sectors. For instance, in the WAEMU region, recent stock market declines have  
particularly affected textiles, tourism, and agro-industrial sectors.  
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Spillovers from Global Recession 
Reflecting their increased integration in the world economy, the global recession is 
expected to have a major impact on LICs (Boxes 3 and 4). LICs are heavily dependent on 
trade, which is shrinking because of lower global demand. Many LICs will also be hit by 
reduced remittances, and possibly lower aid. For net importers of food and fuel, the negative 
impact of these factors will be in part mitigated by the recent drop in food and fuel prices. 
The Trade Channel 
Trade has become a significant source of growth in LICs over the past 20 years. 
Trade openness, calculated as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP, has 
increased substantially since 1991 and has been accompanied by an acceleration of growth.
Most LIC exports go to advanced economies, though this share has been declining. 
The structure of exports remains 
highly concentrated on commodities. In the 
past decade, the mean share of primary 
commodities in the exports of LICs has 
been close to 70 percent. The high 
concentration on commodities may further 
aggravate the impact of the global growth 
slowdown on LICs, to the extent that the 
demand for commodities is highly 
procyclical, with implications for both 
volumes and prices (WEO, 2001).  
LICs are more exposed than in the past to a downturn in global demand for services. 
The share of services in total LIC exports has trended upward over the past decade, the main 
activities being transportation and tourism. For 29 countries in the sample, services 
0
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Sources: UNCTAD Statistics, and Fund staff calculations. 
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accounted for at least 30 percent of exports in 2007, while 8 countries are heavily dependent 
on services receipts (ratio of services receipts greater than 70 percent of exports).13
The latest projections illustrate the 
significant negative impact that LICs are 
likely to face in 2009 via the trade channel
(Table 3). On average, projected current 
account balances for 2009 have 
deteriorated by about 3 percent of GDP 
since the April 2008 WEO, with a more 
pronounced decline in export growth than 
in import growth. The terms of trade are 
also projected to deteriorate, reflecting the 
sharp drop in commodity prices. The 
impact of declining trade in services, by contrast, appears limited.  
Table 3. WEO Projections; Selected Indicators
2007
Spring WEO Current Proj. Spring WEO
Current 
Proj.
Goods
Exports  (Percent of GDP) 26.6 26.8 26.5 26.6 21.8
Imports (Percent of GDP) 40.1 40.6 42.5 39.7 38.6
Services
Exports  (Percent of GDP) 9.7 9.5 9.2 9.5 9.0
Imports (Percent of GDP) 12.2 11.8 14.2 11.2 13.6
Terms of trade (annual change in percent) 2.2 -0.4 -4.7 0.4 -0.7
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
2008 2009
Remittances 
For many LICs, remittances constitute an important source of external financing, 
providing income to the poor and contributing to growth. At a global level, while data are 
weak, remittances are estimated to have increased at a double-digit annual rate since the 
1990s (World Bank, 2006). In the past, they have been relatively stable compared to other 
external flows.14 Remittance flows vary substantially across countries and regions, both from 
the recipient and country of origin point of view (World Bank, 2008). 
13These include Cape Verde, Comoros, Djibouti, Dominica, Eritrea, Grenada, Maldives, St. Lucia, and St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines. 
14For example, in sub-Saharan Africa, remittances have been less volatile than both official flows and FDI 
(Gupta, Pattillo, and Wagh, 2009). 
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Box 3. Comovements in Output and Financial Markets 
Output fluctuations in emerging and developing 
economies have been fairly synchronized with output 
fluctuations in the G-7 countries over the past 15 
years. These linkages are quite important—a 1 
percent change in real GDP growth in the G-7 
countries is associated with a 0.4 percent change in 
growth in emerging and developing countries.1/ For 
LICs, correlations have closely tracked those of other 
emerging and developing countries since the early 
1990s.  
The degree of correlation has varied substantially over time and by region, reflecting idiosyncratic shocks in 
both emerging and developing countries and the seven major advanced economies. Notably, rolling moving 
averages of these correlations indicate that the comovement between the G-7 countries and emerging and 
developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East fell markedly in the 1990s. This decrease 
appears to stem from the diversification of export markets away from the G-7 countries and the series of 
emerging market crises in Asia and Latin America. However, output synchronization between G-7 countries 
and economies in these regions has increased steadily since the late 1990s. In Africa, central and eastern 
Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States, comovements increased sharply in the run-up to the 
current crisis.  
Financial channels 
are also becoming 
increasingly 
important as 
mechanisms through 
which shocks are 
transmitted between 
advanced and 
emerging 
economies, 
including LICs that 
are “frontier” 
emerging markets. 
In particular, equity markets tend to be highly 
correlated and the correlation between advanced and 
emerging market equity prices has been rising over 
time.  With the exception of the bursting of the 
dotcom bubble and initial divergence of equity 
markets in the 2007 in the current crisis, the 
correlation between G-7 and emerging economy 
equity markets has been near one for much of the 
past decade. As a result, capital flows—particularly 
in regions that depend more heavily on portfolio 
equity flows—are likely to be increasingly 
procyclical.  
1/See IMF (2001). World Economic Outlook, Chapter II.  
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Box 4. Spillovers from the Rest of the World into Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
Historically, SSA growth has moved quite closely with 
global real GDP growth. As global growth slows, SSA 
is affected mainly by lower real external demand for its 
exports and declines in commodity prices and the terms 
of trade.  
To quantify the impact of a global slowdown on 
individual African countries, a series of dynamic panel 
regressions were estimated for countries in the region, 
relating real growth in domestic output to world growth 
in trade weighted by partner countries and to several 
control variables: oil prices, non-oil prices, and country 
fixed effects. The sample includes data for 40 
countries, over the period 1970–2007.  
Three key results stand out: 
? A 1 percentage point slowdown in the rest of 
the world has led to an estimated ½ percentage 
point slowdown in SSA countries. The effect 
is partly felt contemporaneously (0.2 percentage point) and partly in the following year (0.3 percentage 
point).  
? A nonfuel commodity-price-induced income reduction by 10 percent tends to reduce growth in sub-
Saharan African exporters by about 1.5 percentage points after two years.  
? An oil price shock tends to be significant only above a certain threshold (5 percent change in prices). A
net oil importer in SSA (with oil imports of some 20 percent of GDP), facing a decline in oil prices of 
say 50 percent, could expect an increase in its growth rate by some 0.3–0.4 percentage point. 
The impact is linear on price changes above the threshold and on oil intensiveness of the economy. It 
appears symmetric for price increases and decreases. 
These estimates reflect the average effects for the average country and shock. While robust to different 
specifications, three important caveats are in order. First, while the cross-country regression estimates seem to 
be broadly in line with structural cross-country regressions in the literature, they explain only a small part of  
the growth variation experienced by SSA countries. This is because a broad range of domestic factors may be  
at play, and may plausibly interact with the shock itself to determine the effects; for example, the level of 
reserves, the policy response, and the expected persistence. Second, the specification does not control for the 
financial channel. Third, estimates reflect short-term effects of changes in the external environment on SSA 
growth.  
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Current projections show remittances stagnating in the second half of  2008, and 
shrinking in 2009. The largest decline is expected in European, Asian, and Pacific LICs. 
Most recent evidence suggests that in some countries the decline in remittances can be 
substantial: in Honduras, for example, remittances declined by 4.5 percent in October 2008 
(year-on-year).  
Foreign Direct Investment  
Over the past two decades, the 
importance of FDI in LICs has grown 
dramatically. On average, FDI in LICs has 
quintupled (in percent of GDP) since 1990. 
The sources of investment have also 
diversified.15
15UNCTAD (2006). 
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FDI flows to LICs are expected to 
shrink sharply. Empirical evidence 
suggests that FDI in LICs is dependent 
on the health of the origin country’s 
economy.16 The latest WEO projections 
show FDI inflows for 2009 falling by 
almost 20 percent from their 2008 levels, 
compared to over 10 percent growth that 
was projected in the April 2008 WEO. 
Multinationals’ reduced profit margins, 
combined with difficult financing  
conditions and volatile commodity prices (FDI in LICs is heavily concentrated in natural 
resource sectors), have already begun to trigger reduced FDI commitments for 2009–10. In 
Lao PDR and Mozambique, for example, FDI related to expansions of hydroelectric and 
mining projects has been delayed or suspended.  
Overall, reduced FDI in 2009 is expected to have a significant impact in over half of 
all LICs. Countries in Latin America and Asia are expected to be most affected. In Africa, 
the impact is expected to be muted, due to FDI concentration in natural resource sectors, 
where new projects may be delayed but most ongoing projects are likely to be continued. The 
losses associated with withdrawing from natural resource projects prior to their completion, 
given the sizable up-front capital investment required for such investments, reduce the 
likelihood of FDI withdrawal.  
Aid Flows 
Poverty-reducing initiatives across the globe have led to sizable aid flows during this 
decade. Aid peaked in 2006, reflecting debt relief (driven by the HIPC and MDRI 
initiatives), coupled with increased flows from emerging donors such as Russia, China, and 
the GCC countries. However, excluding 
debt relief grants, net official 
development assistance remained 
broadly unchanged in real terms in 
2006–07 (OECD, 2008a). 
Potential reductions in aid
flows are a serious concern. Empirical 
evidence shows that aid is procyclical 
with both donor and recipient incomes 
16World Bank (2004); Nonnemberg and Cardoso de Mendonça (2004); Kalotay and Sulstarova (2008). 
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(Bulí? and Hamann, 2006). In a sample of 18 donors, Pallage and Robe (2001) show that the 
comovements of total aid disbursements with donors’ output were positive for almost three-
fourths of donors during 1969–95. Given the severity of the slowdown in growth in advanced 
economies, a potential reduction in aid cannot be ruled out.  
Projections of aid to LICs already 
started to decline in 2009. Growth in aid 
to LICs during 2008 was higher than 
initially anticipated by the WEO spring 
projections. This high level of projected 
aid partially reflected multilateral aid 
packages approved during late 2008 to 
help countries cope with food and fuel 
shocks experienced in early 2008. 
Notwithstanding international 
commitments to scale up aid, projections do not suggest such scaling-up is in the pipeline  
for 2009.
V.   The Fiscal and Debt Sustainability Impact of the Crisis 
Fiscal vulnerabilities are emerging as revenues decline, pressures on spending increase, and 
financing conditions deteriorate. The crisis will aggravate risks of debt distress in vulnerable 
countries.
Fiscal Impact
The financial crisis and global 
recession will aggravate the fiscal 
vulnerability of LICs. Budget revenues 
are expected to suffer as economic 
activity slows and commodity prices  
fall, pressures on spending rise, and 
financing conditions continue to tighten. 
The text chart shows a ranking of these 
factors, based on a survey of LIC  
country teams.  
Revenue and Financing Prospects  
Lower revenue is a key source of fiscal risk. The slowdown in economic activity and 
trade will affect fiscal revenues directly, given the reliance of many LICs on trade taxes. In 
addition, falling remittances from abroad can be expected to hit domestic consumption, and 
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hence revenues from consumption taxes. 
The tourism industry, an important 
source of revenue in some LICs, is also 
likely to contract. 
Commodity revenues would be 
particularly affected—as emphasized by 
over half of country teams. In several 
countries, commodity-related revenues 
constitute more than 20 percent of total 
revenues. While all commodity exporters 
are likely to be hit in 2009, the effect is 
expected to be particularly marked for oil 
and metal producers, where the recent 
price declines have been steepest (e.g., 
Angola, Chad, Republic of Congo, 
Mongolia, Nigeria, and Yemen). The 
downturn has exposed some commodity 
exporters that embarked on ambitious 
spending plans on the basis of optimistic 
revenue assumptions. In countries where 
oil revenues accounted for at least 20 percent of total revenue in 2004, the average non-oil 
fiscal deficit rose from 22 percent of non-oil GDP in 2004 to 39 percent in 2008 as a result of 
rapidly rising expenditure.17 This said, several countries (including Angola, Azerbaijan, the 
Republic of Congo, and Nigeria) accumulated fiscal cushions during the boom years, which 
now reduce their vulnerability. 
Overall, revenue ratios are projected to decline in more than half of LICs in 2009. In 
close to a quarter of the countries, the decline is expected to be more than 2 percentage points 
of GDP. The extent to which revenue 
declines would contribute to vulnerability 
depends on the overall fiscal position and 
availability of financing. It should be 
noted that revenue losses will take place 
even if the revenue ratio is constant, due 
to lower activity. The expected increases 
in the revenue ratio in a number of 
countries mainly reflect ongoing efforts 
to strengthen revenue-raising capacity. 
17Oil exports increased significantly in some countries, including Angola, Azerbaijan, and Timor-Leste.  
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Uncertainty about aid flows, 
potential declines in donor support, and 
tighter financing conditions are likely to 
impose further pressures on LICs’ 
budgets. In about half of the countries, the 
ratio of aid to current spending exceeds 20 
percent, and in 14 countries this proportion 
surpasses 50 percent. In particular, fiscal 
vulnerabilities are high in LICs where 
domestic revenue mobilization has not 
kept pace with rising public spending.18
These countries have relatively small revenue bases, which limits their ability to increase tax 
collections in the short run to offset declines in aid flows. Falling aid was rated as very 
important or important by more than one-third of country teams. Countries such as 
Afghanistan, Burundi, and Rwanda are particularly vulnerable to declines in aid flows.  
Spending Pressures 
Spending pressures may arise from various sources, starting with the sectors more 
directly affected by the external shock. 
? Falling export revenues may exert pressure on government expenditures.
Commodity export sectors that are hit by lower demand and falling prices may seek 
government transfers to offset part of the falling revenues. This will happen if 
commodity marketing boards or state-owned export enterprises are called upon to 
subsidize domestic producers by maintaining higher domestic prices than the 
corresponding export prices. 
? Poverty may increase with the slowdown in growth and falling commodity prices. If 
output declines in capital-intensive industries (such as oil), the impact on employment 
would be limited, at least in the short run. However, in countries that export 
agricultural commodities, falling commodity prices would cut into rural employment 
and incomes, thereby increasing rural poverty. The urban poor, however, may benefit 
as food and energy prices decrease. Various estimates suggest that on average, when 
mean growth declines by 1 percentage point, the poverty head count increases by  
2 percent.19
? Countries may need to expand social spending to address rising poverty levels.
Spending pressures to strengthen safety nets were considered important or very 
18Gupta and Tareq (2008). 
19The poverty elasticity to growth varies across countries; the estimated elasticity of two is the average obtained 
from a cross section of developing and transition countries. See Bourguignon (2003) and Ravallion (2004). 
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important by almost one-third of country teams. Countries that are already planning 
to expand or introduce new programs include Dominica, The Gambia, Guyana, 
Madagascar, Niger, and Senegal. On the other hand, countries that are net importers 
of food and fuel and that increased subsidies on these products during the 2007–08 
price hikes should now be able to scale back their subsidies.20 For example, in 
Pakistan and Yemen the reduction in international petroleum prices has helped create 
room for priority spending. 
? The crisis could affect investment financing schemes. Public-private partnerships for 
public projects and concessions (such as ports and power generation) could come 
under strain because lower demand for services may trigger calls on revenue 
guarantees, and private operators may be affected by the credit crunch.  
Additional spending pressures may arise from currency depreciation and rising 
interest rates.  
? The share of foreign debt in public debt remains high (see next section), and 
depreciation would increase debt servicing costs. The cost of imported goods and 
services would also rise, thus offsetting, at least in part, the effect of lower 
commodity prices. Conversely, depreciation may boost border taxes (including duties 
and VAT on imports) and resource-related revenues.  
? Countries able to access international capital markets may have to pay higher interest 
rates. For instance, the average spread of the four LICs included in the EMBI rose by 
about 1,000 basis points during the past year. And, as noted in the first part of Section 
IV, domestic funding costs have started to rise in a number of LICs—including 
Ghana, Mozambique, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, according to the survey of country 
teams. 
Public finances might also come under pressure if there is a need for government 
support to domestic financial institutions and depositors. Country teams expect that fiscal 
support to the financial system may be required in only a few countries (Cambodia, 
Comoros, Mongolia, and Pakistan), given the generally limited ties of financial systems in 
LICs to global financial markets. However, fiscal risks and vulnerabilities could emerge from 
contingent liabilities of the government and quasi-fiscal activities of central banks if it is 
decided to extend deposit guarantees (as some LICs have already done) or to direct or 
subsidize bank credit to the private sector.  
20IMF (2008). The median fiscal cost of fiscal policy responses to increasing fuel and food subsidies incurred 
since 2006 in a sample of 92 countries was estimated at 0.7 percent of GDP in September 2008. Fiscal costs 
were dominated by increases in fuel subsidies and reductions in fuel taxes. In 24 countries, the combined fiscal 
cost of fuel and food subsidies in 2008 was expected to exceed 2 percent of GDP. 
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The Impact of the Crisis on Debt Sustainability
In recent years, debt indicators in LICs have improved dramatically (Appendix III). 
Over the past decade, debt relief initiatives have significantly reduced the large external debts 
with which LICs have often struggled. With assistance from development partners, including 
the IMF and the World Bank, LICs have been working toward maintaining future debts at 
sustainable levels. Improved debt sustainability has helped create investor and donor 
confidence, as is evidenced by sizable FDI and aid flows to LICs over the past two years. A 
lower debt servicing burden has also freed greater resources for development spending.
However, higher borrowing to help 
 offset the impact of the crisis could pose 
serious risks, in particular for those LICs that 
already have a high debt burden. Debt 
indicators are projected to continue 
improving in 2009 (see figure), albeit by less 
than forecast last spring. However, 28 
countries already have debt in excess of 60 
percent of GDP. Moreover, simulations of 
additional borrowing to offset the shortfalls 
in external financing suggest that a handful  
of countries that are currently on the verge of high risk of debt distress would breach this 
threshold (see Appendix IV). The simulations assume that reduced investment expenditure 
financing from aid and FDI is replaced with public external borrowing.21 If sustained for one 
year, this adds 4 percent of GDP to the average LIC debt burden.  
Second-round effects also pose serious risks to debt sustainability. Given that more 
than half of LICs’ public debt remains external, a depreciation in exchange rates will 
aggravate the ratios of debt to GDP and fiscal revenues. Moreover, contingent liabilities 
resulting from pressures in the banking sector could further weaken the structural 
improvements in the sovereign balance sheet. Several governments have extended explicit or 
implicit guarantees for their banks’ deposits in response to public uncertainty about domestic 
banks. Finally, the decline in reserves poses a risk to LICs’ capacity to service or roll over 
external debt, which remains mostly at short maturities. 
VI.   Country Vulnerabilities and Risks of Further External Shocks 
The external outlook varies widely across LICs and is subject to large risks. The baseline 
projections and illustrative scenarios suggest that 26 LICs could be particularly vulnerable.
21Aid and FDI are each assumed to be reduced by 30 percent of their respective 2008 values. 
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The growth and balance of payments repercussions of the global slowdown for LICs 
remain highly uncertain. Accordingly, this section analyzes LICs’ short-run vulnerabilities to 
the global downturn on the basis of both the most recent projections and various simulations 
of possible further shocks that illustrate the downside risks to the baseline projections. 
The baseline projections show large adverse effects of the global crisis for commodity 
and oil exporters, and countries with entrenched policy weaknesses (see Appendix V, Table 
1). While, on average, projected growth in 2009 has been revised down by 2.1 percentage 
points relative to the April 2008 WEO, this decline amounts to more than 2.5 percent for 24 
countries. Hardest hit are LICs in the Middle East and Europe and, to a lesser extent,  
Latin America and oil-exporting countries. Reserve coverage is projected to decline in 45 
countries, by 0.6 month of imports, on average, with a particularly sharp drop among oil 
exporters. 
Simulations of possible further shocks explore the balance of payments effects of 
lower prices of oil, commodities, and food; lower foreign demand for LIC manufacturing 
exports; and lower financial inflows. The simulations are simple partial equilibrium exercises 
to assess the immediate impact on the balance of payments and reserves of the assumed 
shocks to the trade balance (as a result of lower world market prices and export volumes) and 
to remittances, FDI, and aid.22 The methodology is consistent with the one applied to the 
analysis of the food and fuel price shocks in IMF (2008b). The exercises do not incorporate 
further effects on growth or demand. For each channel, and for all shocks combined, 
countries are ranked in three vulnerability categories—high (H), medium (M), or low (L)—
depending on the impact of these shocks on reserves.23
The simulation results illustrate the wide variation in vulnerabilities across LICs
(Appendix V, Tables 2–7). Over 20 percent of the sample countries are highly vulnerable to 
the specified trade shock (lower world market prices and export volumes). The majority of 
these countries are in Africa. Of the 15 countries with remittances exceeding 10 percent of 
GDP in 2008, 10 appeared highly vulnerable to a decline in remittances. Overall, about half 
of the sample countries appear moderately vulnerable to a sudden decline in FDI. Countries  
22The detailed specification of the shocks is described in Appendix V. In view of the limitations of the partial 
analysis, the simulation results are illustrative and should not be considered as actual projections at the country 
level. The final impact of the global slowdown is highly dependent on policy responses and domestic factors, as 
well as on the interaction of different shocks. In addition, the magnitude of the shocks in the simulations is not 
based on a projection of likely developments. 
23The H category encompasses countries that had reserve coverage below the standard benchmark of 3 months 
of imports in 2008 and that could suffer an additional loss of reserves equivalent to more than 0.5 month in the 
shock scenario. Countries in the M category either start with more than 3 months of import coverage and lose 
more than 0.5 in the shock, or start below 3 months of coverage and lose less than 0.5 month with the shock. In 
the L category, countries start with more than 3 months of import coverage and lose less than 0.5 in the shock 
scenario. 
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Figure 2: Overall Country Vulnerabilities1
1See Appendix V, Table 1, for methodology. Country borders or names in this map do not necessarily 
reflect the IMF's official position. 
in Latin America have relatively high FDI inflows, and hence almost all of them appear 
vulnerable to an FDI shock. Almost 50 percent of countries that received aid in excess of 10 
percent of GDP in 2008 appeared highly vulnerable to reduced aid.
Considering both the current baseline projections and the simulations, 26 countries 
could be considered highly vulnerable to the adverse effects associated with the global 
recession (Figure 2 and Table 4). The baseline projections and simulations are combined to 
provide an overall vulnerability assessment. The most vulnerable countries are especially 
sensitive to trade, aid, and remittances shocks, while FDI appears to be a less important 
transmission channel.24
24The results of this overall assessment are sensitive to the weights placed on the baseline projections relative to 
the simulations. The overall score is a weighted average of individual scores assigned to the change in projected 
2009 real GDP growth relative to the April 2008 WEO projection, the projected change in reserves during 2009, 
and the vulnerability score in a simulation of combined further shocks. In this exercise, a GDP growth reduction 
(continued) 
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Table 4. Vulnerability Table
Real GDP Growth Reserves (in Months of Imports)
2009 current less 
Spring WEO proj. 1/ 2009 less 2008 2/
Albania -2.4 -0.7
Angola -8.6 -1.0
Armenia -5.0 -0.1
Burundi -2.0 -0.6
Central African Rep. -2.0 -0.9
Congo, Dem. Rep. of -7.3 0.6
Côte d'Ivoire -0.7 0.0
Djibouti -1.5 0.2
Ghana -3.4 -1.2
Haiti -1.5 -0.3
Honduras -2.6 -0.7
Kyrgyz Republic -4.6 -0.1
Lao People's Dem.Rep. -3.4 -0.9
Lesotho -3.3 -0.8
Liberia 0.7 0.0
Mauritania -2.8 -0.3
Moldova -4.5 -0.2
Mongolia -3.1 0.0
Nigeria -5.0 -3.9
Papua New Guinea 0.2 -0.9
St. Lucia -5.4 -0.1
St. Vincent & Grens. -4.7 -0.2
Sudan -6.7 0.2
Tajikistan -4.0 0.0
Vietnam -2.5 -0.9
Zambia -2.4 0.2
1/ Current projection for 2009 less Spring WEO projection for 2009
2/ Current projection for 2009 less 2008 actual.
3/ Combined Shock: Trade, Remittances, Aid, FDI. See section IV for description of shocks and Appendix V tables for magnitudes 
of individual shocks.
4/ H = High risk; M=Medium risk; L=Low risk.
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
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VII.   Policy Recommendations  
Many LICs have little room for countercyclical policies to address the impact of the global 
crisis. This highlights the importance of donor support, which will need to be stepped up to 
enable LICs to attenuate the effects of the crisis on poverty. Important domestic policy 
responses include targeted spending to protect the poor, exchange rate flexibility to facilitate 
adjustment, and vigilant financial supervision. 
The ultimate impact of the global financial crisis on LICs is likely to be severe given 
their unique vulnerabilities and limited scope for offsetting policies. In principle, the choice 
between financing and adjustment in response to an adverse shock should depend on its 
expected duration, with temporary shocks calling for financing and permanent shocks 
requiring adjustment. While the evolving global crisis—and its effects on prices, foreign 
demand, and financial inflows—remains very uncertain, arguably many of its effects may be 
in excess of 2.5 percentage points, and a reduction in reserves in excess of 0.5 month of imports are considered 
“large.” See Appendix V for details. 
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considered temporary. In practice, however, initial macroeconomic and debt conditions and 
available financing are likely to be the major factors determining the scope for fiscal easing.  
Fiscal Policy
Fiscal policy responses to the crisis should take into account important characteristics 
of LICs and how the global crisis is affecting these countries. 
? The fall in demand largely originates abroad and is transmitted to LICs through 
foreign trade as a reduction in exports—mainly commodities—due to lower prices 
and volumes. The ability of expansionary fiscal policy to substitute for this decline in 
external demand may be limited, to the extent that resources cannot quickly be 
reoriented across sectors. Attempts to maintain domestic demand through 
countercyclical fiscal policy could spill over into imports, resulting in a net loss of 
foreign reserves (absent more aid), or inflation. 
? Most LICs lack effective social programs to transfer income.  
? Governments cannot ease the fiscal stance as readily as in other countries because of 
liquidity constraints. Access to external financing is typically limited; thin domestic 
financial markets constrain the ability to finance higher fiscal deficits; and monetizing 
larger deficits would likely jeopardize macroeconomic stability. 
? The significant uncertainty about whether the shock is temporary or long-lasting 
argues for cautious policy responses, as government revenues in the years ahead may 
remain weaker than in the recent past. 
Against this background, the fiscal policy response should depend on country-specific 
circumstances. 
? Countries without binding public debt sustainability and financing constraints that 
have achieved macroeconomic stability may have scope to accommodate the 
(cyclical) fiscal deterioration. This would help address the negative impact of the 
crisis on economic activity. A few countries may also have scope for discretionary 
fiscal stimulus aimed at sustaining aggregate demand. In all cases, the space for fiscal 
easing will depend on the availability of financing from external sources on 
concessional terms and the scope to raise and use domestic resources in a 
noninflationary manner, without draining international reserves or crowding out the 
domestic private sector, as this sector is the main source of long-term growth.25
? In formulating spending policies, priority should be given to protecting or expanding 
social programs or bringing forward approved investments, and, in general, to 
25For example, financing constraints are an issue in WAEMU, where commercial banks that bought most of the 
bonds and bills issued by WAEMU governments increasingly face liquidity difficulties. 
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preserving the momentum toward achieving the MDGs. Most LICs have pressing 
infrastructure needs, and protecting or increasing spending in MDG-related sectors 
such as health, education, water and sanitation, and social protection can help cushion 
the impact of the crisis on vulnerable households. These countries may also want to 
reorient their spending composition in favor of programs that stimulate domestic 
economic activity. Spending that is intensive in domestic goods and services is likely 
to be more effective in supporting domestic activity. Existing infrastructure should be 
preserved by protecting spending on operations and maintenance. Initiating new 
infrastructure or social programs should be approached with caution because of the 
weak implementation capacity in many LICs. At a minimum, new projects considered 
for implementation should be properly appraised and prioritized. 
? Some forms of spending increase would best be avoided. The subsidization of 
domestic exporters through the maintenance of higher domestic prices above export 
prices would not be well targeted, as large producers would benefit more. Public 
sector wage increases would also be a poorly targeted form of support and may not be 
sustainable.
Commodity exporters that built financial cushions during the boom may be in a better 
position to maintain spending or adjust gradually. Exporters with no sustainability or 
financing concerns despite the downturn in commodity prices may be in a position to 
maintain spending levels. Some countries that need to retrench because of sustainability 
issues might be able to do so gradually if they had built up financial cushions.26
However, many countries will be forced to adjust their fiscal position. Those 
countries with binding fiscal constraints, including some commodity exporters, will have to 
address a deteriorating fiscal position.  
Those countries can create fiscal space for additional spending or to preserve priority 
spending, including for MDGs. They can do so through increasing revenue or reprioritizing 
spending.  
? Countries with low tax-to-GDP ratios should try to mobilize additional domestic 
revenue. A tax-to-GDP ratio of 15 percent is considered a reasonable target for most 
LICs, and many non-resource-rich LICs have tax-to-GDP ratios well below this 
target. This does not mean that tax rates should be increased. Indeed, in some 
countries, high rates, particularly on mobile production factors (such as skilled labor 
and capital), may be hindering economic growth. In many LICs, low revenues are 
mainly associated with narrow tax bases, rather than low rates. In these countries, a 
rationalization of tax incentives (by reducing exemptions, tax holidays, and 
deductions) together with strengthening of revenue administration should allow lower 
26Barnett and Ossowski (2003). 
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tax rates while mobilizing additional revenues. However, these reforms—which 
should be part of a medium-term strategy—take time. This said, countries should 
carefully review the scope for removing tax exemptions in the context of the next 
budget, with a view to generate revenue. Resource-rich countries should continue to 
make efforts to diversify their revenue base, which would reduce fiscal risks. 
? Fiscal space can also be created through expenditure rationalization and increasing 
spending efficiency. This is important in light of the difficulty of raising revenues 
through quality measures in the short run. Reducing unproductive expenditures, 
particularly those of a recurring nature, while often politically difficult, should be the 
first option. Examples include generalized subsidies, transfers to loss-making 
enterprises, excessively large government employment, and “white elephant” 
projects. Many countries increased subsidies in response to the surge in international 
fuel prices in recent years. With the fall in these prices, the fiscal cost of the subsidies 
should decline.27 Strengthening public financial management systems would 
contribute to improving expenditure efficiency, by ensuring that resources reach their 
intended users. It is important to avoid across-the-board spending cuts, which can 
lead to arrears and inefficiencies, and are often not sustainable. 
In all cases, spending plans should preferably be cast in a medium-term framework 
(MTF). Increases in spending that would not be sustainable in the future should be avoided. 
While the design and implementation of an MTF is a complex process that should be 
approached gradually, many LICs could make greater efforts in this area. 
Care will have to be taken in strengthening safety net programs. Transfer programs 
that effectively target the poorest often result in a larger stimulus to aggregate demand, given 
their higher propensity to consume.28 The capacity of many LICs to put in place new targeted 
programs will be limited in the near term.29 There may be scope, however, to scale up 
existing spending programs in targeted ways: 
? Countries can implement public works programs and/or provide income supplements 
through existing programs. Labor-intensive infrastructure projects can be effective in 
providing income support to the poor while simultaneously delivering fiscal stimulus. 
Setting the wage rate relatively low ensures that the schemes are self-targeted to the 
poor. The going wage for unskilled agricultural labor is often a good benchmark. 
27This may also be an opportune time to reform domestic pricing mechanisms (e.g., from ad hoc price 
adjustment systems to automatic price formulas or price liberalization) where appropriate. 
28Strengthening such programs would also reinforce automatic stabilizers. In countries with financing 
constraints, however, the operation of such stabilizers would require flexibility in other spending areas. 
29Initiatives undertaken in response to the fuel and food price crisis have improved the situation in some 
countries. 
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? Additional resources can be channeled to targeted programs, such as targeted food 
distribution or school meal programs. Expanding conditional cash transfer programs 
that link cash transfers or subsidies to the receipt of health care or education can be an 
effective method of addressing potential losses in human capital. Examples of such 
programs include the Primary Education Stipend Program in Bangladesh, Bolsa
Familia in Brazil, the Education Sector Support Program in Cambodia, Programa de 
Asignación Familiar in Honduras, Oportunidades in Mexico, and Atención a Crisis
and Red de Protección Social in Nicaragua. 
Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy 
An important policy priority will be to maintain domestic macroeconomic stability 
amid deteriorating terms of trade. With declining food and fuel prices, inflationary pressures 
are quickly receding in the large majority of LICs. At the same time, and unlike in some 
advanced economies, risks of deflation seem limited for LICs. Sharp depreciations in the 
wake of balance of payments pressures clearly have the potential to feed through to inflation, 
offsetting the deflationary global environment. Accordingly, while there may be scope for 
monetary easing in some countries with falling inflation, countries experiencing continued or 
renewed price pressures may need to tighten monetary policy. 
Inflationary challenges remain in some LICs where existing aggregate demand 
pressures have yet to be effectively tackled. In 18 LICs, inflation still exceeded 15 percent as 
of end-December 2008 and for 12 of these it is forecast to remain in double digits throughout 
2009, as earlier commodity price increases are still feeding through to the economy, and have 
affected wage demands and inflation expectations. Most of these cases have been associated 
with relatively loose monetary and/or fiscal policies—including in the form of recent high 
wage awards  (Mongolia), an expansionary deficit (Ghana, Ethiopia), and negative real 
interest rates (Azerbaijan).  
Countries with flexible exchange rates should allow them to function as shock 
absorbers in response to the negative external shock stemming from the financial crisis. It 
will generally not be effective to impede needed adjustment in the real exchange rate or 
dissipate reserves through intervention, which should be limited to responding to temporary 
instances of disorderly market conditions. 
Countries with fixed exchange rates may face different challenges, with pressure on 
these arrangements owing to lower net exports, together with, potentially, capital flight and a 
reduction in available external financing. In light of the adverse shocks, exchange rate 
competitiveness and the adequacy of reserves will need to be carefully assessed. For 
countries with de facto rather than formal pegs, in particular, introducing some degree of 
exchange rate flexibility may be advisable (e.g., Armenia, Ethiopia). If the financial crisis is 
prolonged, the pattern of external adjustment—including the use of exchange rates—would 
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shift over time. While exchange rate adjustment may be avoided in the short term, extended 
balance of payments pressures could make adjustment unavoidable. 
Protectionist measures should be avoided. Limiting imports through tariffs or 
quantitative restrictions lowers welfare by distorting incentives, and new barriers can be hard 
to rescind when the current pressures subside.  
Financial Sector
As mentioned above, potential negative fallout from the crisis on LICs’ financial 
system remains high. In this context, LICs need to focus on immediate crisis prevention 
measures including by preparing contingency and remediation plans for the financial system.  
In the short term, it will be critical to monitor the risks and take actions that focus on 
reducing uncertainty and engender confidence. Dynamics in domestic debt and financial 
markets can have serious spillover effects on the domestic banking system and hence on 
credit availability. Analysis of such linkages should be undertaken at both the institutional 
and systemic levels.  
At the private sector level, financial institutions could initiate balance sheet repair.
Where capitalization is weak, fresh equity may need to be raised or medium-term funding 
sources sought, even if the cost of doing so is high. A critical evaluation should also be 
undertaken of institutions’ overall risk management systems, particularly for liquidity and 
counterparty risk management. Stress tests should be conducted to identify potential balance 
sheet vulnerabilities, account for possible longer periods of funding illiquidity, and develop 
firm-specific contingency plans. These should guide the formulation of appropriate 
adjustments in risk management. 
Similar steps are required for the official sector. The channels through which risks 
could materialize should be subject to high-frequency monitoring, and countries should 
review their crisis management frameworks. Prudential rules should be rigorously enforced, 
and supervision extended to key non-bank institutions and local capital markets. Given the 
possibility of direct interventions utilizing the government balance sheet, official reserve 
holdings should be carefully monitored. Likewise, debt management would need to focus 
increasingly on liquidity risks in addition to the sovereign’s solvency, take account of the 
maturity structure and nonresident holdings of locally issued debt, and optimize the mix 
between local-currency domestic debt and external borrowing. 
Countries could also improve coordination amongst the government, the central bank, 
and supervisory agencies. This will facilitate anticipation of liquidity and solvency problems. 
It will also help avoid a “rush to regulate” that may create further illiquid conditions or a 
credit squeeze, or a culture of non-repayment of bank loans. Central banks must have reliable 
access to financial information of all regulated financial institutions. The medium-term 
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agenda of the financial sector reforms process should remain on track, or even be advanced. 
Deepening money and foreign exchange markets and developing the investor base will help 
to improve liquidity management. Progress would depend on implementing appropriate
monetary policy frameworks, operating procedures, and instruments; improving central bank 
liquidity forecasting and its coordination with government cash management; and 
strengthening inter-bank money and foreign exchange markets, the shallowness of which 
often leads to excessive volatility. Reform of the non-bank financial sector can be a powerful 
tool to increase the demand for longer maturities and reduce rollover risks. 
VIII.   Financing Needs of LICs as a Result of the Crisis 
The additional financing needs of LICs resulting from the crisis could amount to about 
US$25 billion in 2009, and could rise much further. 
At this stage, any projection of LICs’ balance of payments needs in light of the global 
financial crisis should be considered as highly tentative. Previous sections have highlighted 
the uncertainties surrounding the many variables that feed into a calculation of financing 
needs. Nevertheless, in this section we offer some preliminary estimates of the amount of 
additional external financing that LICs would need in order to withstand the crisis-related 
shocks without excessive import contraction or depletion of reserves.30
Current baseline projections for 2009 suggest an aggregate additional financing need 
for LICs of about US$25 billion (Table 5). However much larger financing needs would 
result without import adjustment or if various downside risks were to materialize. The 
reserve level for end-2009 that was projected in the April 2008 WEO projections serves as 
the benchmark for calculating the additional financing need. 
? Current projections foresee an adverse balance of payments shock for 38 LICs in 
2009, amounting to about US$165 billion in total, relative to the April 2008 
projections (Table 5 and Appendix VI). However, various downside risks to the 
baseline could result in a much larger impact, as illustrated in the “bad case” scenario. 
In this scenario, the shocks described in the simulation of Section VI occur 
simultaneously, with an overall balance of payments impact of US$216 billion.31
30The analysis in this section focuses on the availability of foreign exchange reserves at the level of the central 
bank. In practice, actual import adjustment depends not only on the total financing available to the country, but 
also on its availability to specific groups—households, firms, and public entities—many of which are liquidity 
constrained and may have no alternative but to contract their spending in response to adverse shocks. 
31This simulation differs from the one for a combined shock in Section VI, in that it does not include a 
downward shock to aid. Otherwise, the estimated financing need—which can be considered the need for aid—
would be artificially augmented by an ex ante aid decline.   
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(in US$, billions) number of 
countries
(in US$, billions) number of 
countries
Total balance of payments shock 3/ 165 38 216 60
Total reserves loss 4/ 131 35 216 60
Additional financing need 5/ 25 22 138 48
1/ All changes are relative to the Spring 2008 WEO projection for 2009. See Appendix VI for details.
2/ This corresponds with the simulated combined shocks to exports, remittances, and FDI described in Section VI and Appendix V.
3/ The sum of the shocks to exports, FDI, remittances, and the price effects of food and fuel price changes (but excluding import responses).
4/ The total change in reserves for LICs with reserves losses.
5/ The total change in reserves for LICs with reserves coverage falling below 3 months of imports or by more than 0.5 months to less than 4 months.
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
Current 2009 proj. "Bad case" scenario 2/
Table 5. LIC Balance of Payments Shock and Financing Needs in 2009 1/
? Since the projections incorporate some policy adjustment and import compression in 
response to the crisis, these shocks are projected to result in a loss of reserves in 35 
LICs. The total decline in reserves (again, relative to the spring 2008 projection) for 
these countries amounts to US$131 billion.32
? In 22 LICs, reserves are now expected to fall below 3 months of imports.33 The total 
reserves loss in these countries amounts to US$25 billion—equivalent to about 80 
percent of the annual aid received by LICs over the past five years (based on OECD 
Development Assistance Committee data). This represents a minimal estimate of the 
additional financing need. Support on a larger scale would be needed to help 
countries avoid the procyclical adjustment that is assumed in the projections, 
including in countries that may not see significant balance of payments needs but face 
increased budgetary pressures. In addition, if the adverse shocks turn out to be larger 
than expected, more support would be needed, as shown in the “bad case” scenario.   
IX.   Fund Support 
The Fund is working actively with its partner institutions and national authorities to assess 
the economic and balance of payments impact of the financial crisis on LICs, and assist them 
through policy advice, financing, and technical assistance.  
The Fund will provide financial support to LICs hit by the crisis in a manner that 
responds to their economic circumstances, the nature of the balance of payments problem, 
and their existing program relationship, if any, with the Fund:  
32As the “bad case” scenario does not incorporate any policy responses, the reserve loss in this scenario equals 
the total balance of payments impact of the shocks. 
33Also including cases where reserves fall by more than 0.5 month of imports, to less than 4 months. 
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? For countries with existing PRGF arrangements, an augmentation of the arrangement 
is generally the appropriate mechanism. In 2008, 11 such augmentations were granted 
in response to the food and fuel price shocks. 
? For countries without an existing IMF arrangement, the revised Exogenous Shocks 
Facility (ESF) may be a suitable mechanism for IMF financing to the extent that the 
shock is of an exogenous nature. In December 2008 and January 2009, 5 countries 
benefited from support under the ESF. 
? For countries with balance of payments needs that might require longer-term program 
engagement, a new PRGF arrangement may in principle be the most appropriate 
instrument, owing to its longer horizon and greater structural focus. 
? The Fund has also launched a broad review of its financial facilities, including for 
LICs, to ensure its assistance is best tailored to its members’ needs. 
The Fund also has an important role to play in providing policy advice to members 
responding to a more demanding macroeconomic and financial environment. Surveillance 
may be particularly relevant as a tool for ex ante LIC crisis prevention/mitigation efforts and 
for those LICs that are not yet in a position to implement Fund-supported programs, and/or 
lack the capacity to absorb technical assistance.  
In several areas, LICs are likely to need enhanced technical support. Most LICs face 
significant capacity constraints. The Fund, along with its partners, may need to scale up the 
provision of technical assistance (TA) to help LICs address the crisis and continue moving 
ahead with broader public and financial sector reforms. Concerning the latter, the Fund could 
help implement best practices in crisis management, balance sheet risk management, and 
debt and liquidity risk management. The upcoming FSAPs in the LICs could focus on these 
areas. Several countries have set up crisis management committees and technical groups, 
which the Fund can support. TA also plays an important role for members faced with the 
need to strengthen public expenditure management systems, enhance domestic revenue, and 
improve debt management. 
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Appendix I. Countries Included in the Analysis  
The group of LICs analyzed in the paper is formed by the 71 PRGF-eligible countries for 
which data were available, which include, by region:  
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and 
Zambia. 
Middle East and Europe 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Sudan, Tajikistan, 
Uzbekistan, Republic of Yemen. 
Asia 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, India, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Sri Lanka, Vietnam. 
Latin America 
Bolivia, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines. 
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Appendix II. The April 2008 WEO Projections and the Most Recent Updates  
2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
Afghanistan, I.S. of 8.6 8.4 3.2 3.1 0.0 -1.0 3.6 7.7 3.2 3.5 -2.8 -2.3
Albania 6.0 6.1 3.9 3.8 -8.3 -5.5 6.0 3.7 4.8 4.1 -10.0 -7.5
Angola 16.0 13.2 6.1 7.3 12.0 11.8 12.2 4.6 4.1 3.1 5.8 1.3
Armenia 10.0 8.0 3.7 3.7 -6.8 -5.0 6.8 3.0 3.6 3.5 -13.7 -12.9
Azerbaijan 18.6 15.6 6.3 6.9 39.5 39.2 9.5 8.0 5.9 7.1 30.9 10.9
Bangladesh 5.5 6.5 2.4 2.4 -0.5 -0.7 5.0 5.3 2.7 2.7 0.7 0.5
Benin 5.4 5.7 8.2 7.9 -6.1 -6.0 5.1 3.6 7.5 6.9 -9.6 -8.3
Bhutan 7.8 6.7 10.7 10.8 9.5 2.3 6.6 5.7 11.9 11.7 11.7 2.8
Bolivia 4.7 5.0 9.8 10.3 12.3 8.6 5.9 4.0 14.9 14.2 11.0 -4.3
Burkina Faso 4.0 6.3 5.4 4.9 -11.5 -10.7 4.5 4.0 6.0 5.4 -11.3 -9.5
Burundi 5.9 5.7 3.3 4.4 -12.0 -12.2 4.5 3.7 4.4 3.8 -12.5 -8.0
Cambodia 7.2 7.0 2.3 2.2 -5.4 -6.2 6.5 4.8 3.3 2.9 -11.9 -7.1
Cameroon 4.5 4.6 5.7 6.5 0.0 -0.4 3.7 3.5 6.8 6.1 0.4 -5.4
Cape Verde 7.7 7.4 3.4 3.5 -11.6 -12.8 6.0 5.0 3.1 3.2 -13.0 -12.7
Central African Rep. 4.9 5.0 1.6 1.7 -6.4 -6.7 2.8 3.0 3.4 2.5 -8.7 -7.2
Chad 1.8 2.5 3.8 4.4 -2.2 -4.0 -0.4 3.6 5.6 3.5 -9.5 -19.6
Comoros 1.6 3.0 7.6 7.2 -3.5 -4.3 0.5 0.8 6.8 6.3 -8.7 -8.3
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 8.8 11.6 0.4 0.5 -10.7 -24.6 8.2 4.4 0.7 1.3 -12.4 -19.8
Congo, Republic of 9.2 10.6 7.8 14.3 6.0 10.9 7.6 10.3 8.3 7.1 -0.8 -18.1
Côte d'Ivoire 2.9 5.1 2.8 2.7 0.6 -0.5 2.9 4.4 2.8 2.8 0.1 -2.6
Djibouti 6.5 7.6 2.3 2.7 -22.6 -17.8 5.9 6.0 2.8 3.0 -38.2 -14.0
Dominica 3.5 3.0 3.5 3.5 -26.6 -23.9 2.6 1.5 6.6 6.7 -30.1 -24.4
Eritrea 1.2 2.0 2.1 1.7 -5.1 -5.5 1.2 1.6 1.1 0.9 -2.7 1.1
Ethiopia 8.4 7.1 1.5 1.6 -4.3 -6.1 11.6 6.5 1.2 1.7 -5.8 -5.9
Gambia, The 6.5 6.5 3.8 4.0 -12.1 -10.9 5.5 6.0 4.5 4.2 -13.9 -12.5
Georgia 9.0 9.0 1.8 1.6 -16.6 -13.2 2.0 2.5 2.7 3.1 -21.8 -17.7
Ghana 6.9 7.5 1.7 1.5 -9.8 -7.9 6.5 4.0 1.8 0.6 -20.2 -15.9
Grenada 4.3 4.0 2.6 2.5 -25.4 -25.8 1.6 0.6 3.0 3.2 -31.8 -31.8
Guinea 4.9 5.2 1.4 2.1 -10.9 -9.8 4.7 4.1 1.5 2.0 -4.1 -2.6
Guinea-Bissau 3.2 3.1 7.4 8.1 7.0 2.8 3.2 3.1 6.1 6.8 0.2 -11.6
Guyana 4.6 4.5 2.3 2.1 -16.6 -15.8 3.2 4.6 3.1 3.0 -20.8 -18.1
Haiti 3.7 4.0 2.0 2.1 -1.3 -2.5 1.3 2.5 3.1 2.8 -2.6 -4.4
Honduras 4.8 4.6 2.9 3.0 -9.5 -9.0 4.0 2.0 3.1 2.3 -13.3 -8.3
India 7.9 8.0 9.2 8.8 -3.1 -3.4 7.3 5.1 9.7 8.8 -2.5 -1.8
Kenya 2.5 3.4 3.2 3.0 -5.5 -3.8 2.0 3.0 3.2 3.5 -6.6 -2.7
Kyrgyz Republic 7.0 6.5 3.3 3.3 -8.3 -7.4 7.5 1.9 3.6 3.4 -6.0 -6.5
Lao People's Dem.Rep 7.9 8.2 2.2 2.5 -21.7 -15.5 6.8 4.8 3.1 2.2 -15.1 -11.9
Lesotho 5.2 5.4 7.8 8.5 5.0 4.5 3.9 2.1 6.7 5.9 -3.7 -8.5
Liberia 9.5 10.2 0.6 0.6 -42.1 -36.2 7.1 10.9 0.7 0.7 -31.8 -42.2
Madagascar 6.8 7.3 2.5 2.9 -27.4 -16.7 7.0 5.1 2.8 3.3 -22.6 -14.8
Malawi 7.1 6.2 1.9 2.4 -2.9 -4.4 8.0 6.6 0.9 1.3 -8.0 -4.6
Maldives 4.5 4.0 1.4 2.3 -35.7 -19.2 6.5 6.5 2.7 3.5 -46.0 -30.1
Mali 4.3 5.1 5.4 5.6 -7.5 -6.7 4.9 4.4 5.1 5.2 -6.1 -6.2
Mauritania 6.1 6.8 3.4 3.5 -8.6 -12.0 4.9 3.9 1.1 0.7 -6.1 -8.6
Moldova 7.0 8.0 3.2 3.6 -10.3 -10.6 6.5 3.5 3.3 3.1 -18.9 -19.2
Mongolia 8.7 8.1 4.4 4.5 -17.1 -17.6 9.8 5.0 2.3 2.3 -9.2 -7.1
Mozambique 7.0 7.0 4.2 4.5 -11.3 -10.3 6.2 5.5 4.9 4.8 -12.7 -11.8
Myanmar 4.0 4.0 3.8 3.8 2.9 2.0 4.5 5.0 0.7 0.7 3.3 1.3
Nepal 4.0 4.5 4.2 3.7 0.5 0.2 4.7 4.6 7.2 7.2 2.6 3.3
Nicaragua 4.0 4.2 1.4 0.8 -24.8 -24.4 3.0 1.5 2.7 2.8 -23.6 -17.7
Niger 4.4 4.5 3.4 3.3 -9.7 -14.0 5.9 4.5 3.9 3.1 -9.9 -22.6
Nigeria 9.1 8.3 14.8 18.7 6.5 5.7 5.3 3.3 14.2 10.3 5.0 -10.7
Pakistan 6.0 6.7 3.2 3.1 -6.9 -6.1 5.8 2.0 2.4 2.8 -8.4 -4.7
Papua New Guinea 5.8 4.7 4.1 4.2 3.3 1.7 7.0 4.9 5.7 4.9 3.2 -5.5
Rwanda 6.0 5.6 4.9 4.8 -9.5 -12.7 8.5 6.0 5.5 4.8 -6.9 -7.6
São Tomé & Príncipe 6.0 6.0 6.2 6.0 -36.1 -32.9 5.8 5.5 4.3 3.9 -34.0 -43.0
Senegal 5.4 5.9 3.7 3.8 -10.3 -11.1 3.9 4.5 3.5 3.6 -12.4 -10.4
Sierra Leone 6.5 6.5 3.4 3.7 -6.4 -5.9 5.5 5.0 3.6 3.5 -6.8 -4.5
Sri Lanka 6.4 5.6 2.5 2.5 -5.7 -4.9 6.0 3.8 1.6 1.5 -7.7 -5.9
St. Lucia 4.4 4.4 2.2 2.1 -18.5 -17.9 1.7 -1.0 2.2 2.1 -29.5 -23.7
St. Vincent & Grens. 5.0 4.9 2.2 2.0 -26.7 -23.3 1.9 0.2 2.6 2.4 -34.1 -28.4
Sudan 7.6 12.7 1.5 2.9 -9.8 -5.6 8.5 6.0 1.4 1.5 -7.0 -10.0
Tajikistan 4.1 7.0 0.8 1.0 -8.3 -7.1 7.9 3.0 0.6 0.5 -8.9 -8.6
Tanzania 7.8 8.0 4.3 3.8 -9.7 -10.1 7.0 5.3 5.6 5.8 -9.9 -8.6
Togo 3.0 4.0 2.6 2.5 -7.9 -6.7 0.8 2.0 3.5 3.2 -7.0 -6.4
Uganda 7.1 7.0 6.4 6.1 -7.7 -9.3 9.5 6.0 7.5 6.9 -6.1 -7.9
Uzbekistan 8.0 7.5 16.1 17.6 24.6 20.8 9.1 7.0 10.5 11.3 13.5 7.3
Vietnam 7.3 7.3 2.6 2.3 -13.6 -11.9 6.2 4.8 4.5 3.6 -10.3 -8.2
Yemen, Republic of 4.1 8.1 10.8 10.5 -1.4 0.9 3.9 7.7 13.2 11.6 -2.1 -2.8
Zambia 6.3 6.3 3.0 3.5 -5.5 -3.9 5.8 4.0 3.2 3.3 -8.9 -8.3
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
1/ Next year imports of goods and services.
2/ Including current transfers.
in percent of GDP
WEO Spring 2008 Current Projections
in percent of GDP (months of imports 1/)(months of imports 1/)
Reserves GDP growth ReservesCurrent Acc. Balance 2/
Table 1. Selected Economic Indicator Projections, Spring 2008, and Current Projection 
(In percent average, unless otherwise indicated)
Current Acc.Balance 2/GDP growth
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2008 2009 2008 2009
All LICs 7.1 6.0 11.2 7.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 6.7 5.3 10.2 6.4
Asia 8.8 6.0 13.5 8.2
Middle East and Europe 10.3 7.9 14.4 8.7
Latin American countries 6.2 6.5 9.9 6.9
Net Oil importers 7.0 6.0 10.8 6.9
Net Oil exporters 8.3 7.3 11.8 8.2
Countries according to their per capita income 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
top 25% 6.0 4.5 9.0 4.5
mid 50% 8.5 6.1 12.0 7.9
bottom 25% 8.0 6.4 11.2 9.8
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
Table 2. Inflation Projections, Spring 2008, and Current Projection
(In percent, median)
WEO Spring 2008 Latest Projections
2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
All LICs 6.2 6.4 4.2 4.5 -7.7 -7.3 5.4 4.3 4.4 4.2 -9.6 -10.2
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.9 6.3 4.3 4.8 -7.7 -7.9 5.3 4.6 4.3 3.9 -8.9 -11.0
Asia 6.5 6.4 4.0 4.0 -6.7 -5.7 6.2 5.0 4.4 4.2 -6.6 -5.5
Middle East and Europe 8.0 8.7 4.9 5.2 -2.6 -1.0 6.7 4.8 4.8 4.8 -7.5 -7.4
Latin American countries 4.3 4.3 3.2 3.1 -15.2 -14.9 2.8 1.8 4.6 4.4 -19.4 -17.9
Net Oil importers 5.9 6.0 3.5 3.6 -10.9 -10.1 5.2 4.1 3.8 3.6 -12.7 -11.3
Net Oil exporters 7.3 7.9 6.5 7.5 3.4 2.3 5.9 5.1 6.7 6.0 0.8 -6.5
Countries according to their per capita income
top 25% 7.7 7.0 4.0 4.5 -9.3 -7.6 5.5 3.9 4.2 4.1 -13.7 -13.6
mid 50% 5.5 6.3 4.8 5.0 -6.3 -5.9 5.1 4.1 5.0 4.6 -8.0 -8.7
bottom 25% 6.0 6.2 3.3 3.4 -8.8 -9.5 5.9 5.2 3.5 3.4 -8.7 -9.8
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
1/ Next year imports of goods and services.
2/ Including current transfers.
WEO Spring 2008 Latest Projections
Table 1 continued. Selected Economic Indicator Projections, Spring 2008, and Current Projection
(In percent average, unless otherwise indicated)
GDP growth Reserves Current Acc. Bal. 2/ GDP growth Reserves Current Acc. Bal. 2/
(months of imports 1/) in percent of GDP (months of imports 1/) in percent of GDP
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Figure 1. Selected Indicators; LICs versus the World, 1980-2008;1/ Current Projection
Sources: WEO, and World Bank WDI databases.
1. Emerging and developing countries.
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Figure 2. Selected Indicators; LICs by Regions
(Period averages, in percent, unless otherwise indicated)
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
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Appendix IV. Debt Simulations 
The global slowdown could have potentially important implications for LIC debt 
sustainability. The magnitude of these implications is highly uncertain. Accordingly, this 
section presents the details on the simulation to analyze LICs’ risk of debt distress. The debt 
simulations for 2009 assume reduced investment expenditure financing from aid, and FDI is 
replaced with public external borrowing (the reductions in aid and FDI in this simulation are 
identical to those in the simulations of Appendix V). Debt levels are measured relative to 
GDP and the corresponding debt service relative to exports. A country is considered at high 
risk of debt distress if these ratios exceed their corresponding thresholds.34 In order to provide 
a broad range of results for each country, the simulations comprise two scenarios — one 
where new debt is contracted under nonconcessional terms and the other under concessional 
terms.35
The results of this appendix are for illustrative purposes only and should not be 
considered as actual debt projections at the country level. The final impact of the global 
slowdown is highly dependent on policy responses and domestic factors, as well as on the 
interaction of different shocks. In addition, the magnitude of the shocks to FDI and aid in the 
simulations, and consequently any public debt that replaces these financing sources, is not 
based on a projection of likely developments. 
The risks to debt sustainability posed by the current financial crisis vary depending on 
initial conditions (Table 1). The debt simulations for 2009 assume that reduced investment 
expenditure financing from aid and FDI is replaced with public external borrowing. Relative 
to GDP, the simulated increase in public external borrowing during one year adds 4 percent 
of GDP to the average LIC debt burden. For countries with already high debt levels, this 
further raises risks of debt distress. Moreover for some of the poorest LICs, aid represents a 
large portion of GDP. Consequently, replacing public debt for a portion of that aid 
significantly increases their already high debt burden. A handful of countries that were 
previously on the verge of high risk of debt distress become so as a result of the simulation. 
At the same time, with few exceptions, LICs with sustainable debt prior to the crisis would 
continue to avoid high risk of debt distress.  
The results also illustrate the importance of new borrowing being on concessional 
terms. The distinction between concessional and nonconcessional debt has an important 
impact on the debt service burden.   
34The thresholds are commensurate with those applied in World Bank/IMF debt sustainability analysis for LICs 
and are designed to correspond to the World Bank’s Country Performance and Institutional Assessment ratings. 
35Commercial interest rates are assumed to be 8 percent, consistent with the World Bank/IMF debt 
sustainability analysis assumptions, and concessional rates are assumed to be on IDA terms. 
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Appendix IV. Table 1. Debt Implications 1/
Debt in percent of GDP Debt Service in percent of Exports of Goods and Services
High Risk of Debt Distress Measured 
by Debt/GDP
High Risk of Debt Distress Measured 
by Debt Service/Exports
2008 proj. 2009 proj. 2009 simul. 2008 proj. 2009 proj. 2009 simul. 2008 proj. 2009 simul. 2008 proj. 2009 simul.
Conc. 2/ Non-Conc. 2/ Conc. 2/ Non-Conc. 2/ Conc. 2/ Non-Conc. 2/ Conc. 2/ Non-Conc. 2/
Afghanistan, I.R. of . . . . . . . .      
Albania 17 18 19 19 8 9 9 10      
Angola 10 15 13 13 3 6 6 7      
Armenia 14 16 16 16 2 3 3 4      
Azerbaijan 6 10 6 6 1 2 2 2      
Bangladesh 24 24 25 25 5 5 5 5      
Benin 12 14 16 16 5 5 5 7      
Bhutan 65 64 69 69 15 15 15 16 1 1 1   
Bolivia 19 21 20 20 6 9 9 10      
Burkina Faso 19 22 22 22 6 5 5 8      
Burundi 127 27 132 132 3 2 2 7 1 1 1   
Cambodia 26 26 31 31 0 1 1 1  1 1   
Cameroon 6 8 7 7 8 10 10 10      
Cape Verde 55 56 61 61 8 7 7 8 1 1 1   
Central African Rep. 50 50 52 52 9 11 11 12 1 1 1   
Chad 19 24 23 23 3 4 4 5      
Comoros 47 48 50 50 13 10 11 12 1 1 1   
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 87 23 93 93 4 7 7 9 1 1 1   
Congo, Republic of 50 68 57 57 5 6 6 7 1 1 1   
Côte d'Ivoire 83 80 84 84 9 12 12 12 1 1 1   
Djibouti 64 65 76 76 7 13 13 15 1 1 1   
Dominica 59 56 68 68 -26 -24 -24 -22 1 1 1   
Eritrea 59 57 61 61 25 24 24 25 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ethiopia 11 14 14 14 1 3 3 5      
Gambia, The 44 46 47 47 24 24 24 25 1 1 1 1 1 1
Georgia 34 39 39 39 15 24 24 25      1
Ghana 37 42 41 41 3 3 3 4      
Grenada 78 77 86 86 15 18 18 20 1 1 1   
Guinea 67 21 69 69 20 10 10 11 1 1 1 1  
Guinea-Bissau 235 224 243 243 11 427 427 429 1 1 1  1 1
Guyana 80 89 89 89 0 1 1 1 1 1 1   
Haiti 23 26 27 27 6 9 9 11      
Honduras 17 16 20 20 2 2 2 2      
India 19 19 19 19 7 7 7 7      
Kenya 19 19 20 20 5 4 4 4      
Kyrgyz Republic 52 49 55 55 3 4 4 5 1 1 1   
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 98 104 105 105 14 16 17 18 1 1 1  1 1
Lesotho 39 38 52 52 3 5 5 7  1 1   
Liberia 475 468 490 490 0 0 0 4      
Madagascar 25 29 30 30 2 4 4 5      
Malawi 17 18 22 22 4 4 4 5      
Maldives 83 92 90 90 9 10 10 10 1 1 1   
Mali 22 25 23 23 3 4 4 4      
Mauritania 57 60 60 60 . . . . 1 1 1   
Moldova 44 49 48 48 14 15 15 15 1 1 1   
Mongolia 35 47 40 40 3 4 4 5      
Mozambique 52 52 66 66 19 28 29 33 1 1 1  1 1
Myanmar 28 27 28 28 3 4 4 4      
Nepal 28 29 29 29 9 9 9 10      
Nicaragua 69 54 75 75 10 9 9 10 1 1 1   
Niger 14 17 19 19 12 11 11 13      
Nigeria 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 4      
Pakistan 27 32 28 28 14 12 13 13      
Papua New Guinea 20 18 21 21 6 8 8 8      
Rwanda 15 15 21 21 3 2 3 7      
São Tomé & Príncipe 70 50 88 88 . . . . 1 1 1   
Senegal 38 44 41 41 5 8 8 9  1 1   
Sierra Leone 17 16 20 20 1 2 2 3      
Somalia . . . . . . . .      
Sri Lanka 43 42 44 44 . . . . 1 1 1   
St. Lucia 44 46 49 49 8 8 8 9      
St. Vincent & Grens. 0 . 7 7 16 18 18 20      
Sudan 58 65 61 61 4 11 11 13 1 1 1   
Tajikistan 45 46 46 46 86 32 32 33 1 1 1 1 1 1
Tanzania 34 34 38 38 1 1 2 3      
Togo 64 62 66 66 2 4 4 4 1 1 1   
Uganda 13 15 16 16 3 3 3 4      
Uzbekistan 14 13 14 14 6 7 7 7      
Vietnam 30 33 37 37 3 5 5 6      
Yemen, Republic of 22 22 23 23 2 3 3 4      
Zambia 6 7 8 8 1 2 2 3      
All LICs 48 46 52 52 8 14 14 15 28 31 31 4 6 7
SSA 55 50 60 60 6 18 18 20 15 17 17 3 4 4
Asia 37 40 40 40 6 7 7 7 4 5 5 0 1 1
Middle East/Europe 31 33 34 34 12 10 10 11 5 5 5 1 1 2
Latin America 43 43 49 49 4 5 5 7 4 4 4 0 0 0
Net oil importers 52 51 57 57 8 16 16 18 22 25 25 4 6 7
Net oil exporters 33 32 36 36 5 7 7 8 6 6 6 0 0 0
Countries with top 25% 
per capita income
41 47 45 45 5 7 7 8 8 8 8 0 0 1
Countries with mid 50% 
per capita income
37 36 40 40 9 8 8 9 13 16 16 2 2 2
Countries with bottom 
25% per capita income
77 67 82 82 7 33 33 35 7 7 7 2 4 4
1/ Reduced FDI and aid, relative to 2008, are assumed to be fully replaced by external debt (private and public) value to obtain 2009 simulations. 
FDI and aid are each reduced by 30 percent of their 2008 value to obtain 2009 simulations.
2/ Conc. (non-conc) indicates the scenario with concessional (non-concessional) borrowing in 2009.
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
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Appendix V. Simulation Results 
While the global slowdown is spreading worldwide, LICs are expected to witness 
serious macroeconomic effects, with important balance of payments repercussions. The 
magnitude of these repercussions is highly uncertain. Accordingly, this section presents an 
overall assessment of the LICs’ short-run vulnerabilities to the global downturn, 
incorporating in part LIC vulnerabilities resulting from a combination of simulated shocks. 
The details of various simulation channels to analyze LICs’ short-run balance of payments 
vulnerabilities to the global downturn are also presented. The balance of payments 
simulations relate to the channels highlighted in the second part of Section IV. The 
simulation exercises of possible shocks to trade, remittances, FDI, and aid presented here are 
consistent with the methodology applied to the analysis of the food and fuel price shocks in 
IMF (2008b). 
The overall vulnerability assessment for LICs analyzes LICs’ short-run vulnerabilities 
to the global downturn on the basis of both its effects in the current baseline projections 
and the simulation exercise. The current baseline projections used in this exercise are for 
real GDP growth and reserves in months of imports.36 The simulation is a simple partial 
equilibrium exercise to assess the immediate impact on the balance of payments and reserves 
of the assumed shocks: the trade balance (as a result of lower world market prices and export 
volumes), remittances, FDI, and aid. The exercises do not incorporate further effects on 
growth or demand. The overall vulnerability assessment ranks countries in three vulnerability 
categories—high (H), medium (M), or low (L). A country is considered to have high overall 
vulnerability when the current baseline projects a sizable decline in real GDP growth and 
reserves in conjunction with significant vulnerability in the shock simulation.37 For the shock 
simulation and each of its individual channels, countries are also ranked in three vulnerability 
categories—high (H), medium (M), or low (L)—depending on the impact of these shocks 
expressed in terms of the import coverage of reserves. The H category encompasses countries 
that had a reserve coverage of less than three months of imports in 2008 and could lose more 
than an extra 0.5 month in the shock scenario.38 While three months of import coverage is a 
standard benchmark, actual vulnerabilities depend on a range of factors, in particular the 
36In these exercises, reserve coverage is measured in terms of current year imports rather than the following 
year imports (the regular measure), as the latter would have required assumptions on import in 2010, and thus 
on the permanency and growth effects of the shocks, which goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
37A reduction in excess of 2.5 percent of GDP is considered a large reduction in projected real GDP. A 
moderate decline in real GDP could correspond to a 0.5 percent drop. A large reduction in reserves in months of 
imports is a decline in excess of 0.5 month of imports. Any reduction below this would be considered moderate. 
38Countries in the M category either start with more than 3 months of export coverage and lose more than 0.5 in 
the shock, or start below 3 months of coverage and lose less than 0.5 month with the shock. In the L bracket, 
countries start with more than 3 months of import coverage and lose less than 0.5 in the shock scenario. For 
members of the CFA zone, the weight of reserves adequacy was reduced. 
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exchange rate regime. Accordingly, the simple methodology presented here offers only a 
crude approximation of the country-specific vulnerabilities.  
Stressing the limitations of the partial analysis conducted here, the results of this 
appendix should not be considered as actual projections at the country level. The final 
impact of the global slowdown is highly dependent on policy responses and domestic factors, 
as well as on the interaction of different shocks. In addition, the magnitude of the shocks in 
the simulations is not based on a projection of likely developments. Therefore, the results 
presented in this appendix should be considered only for illustrative purposes.
Overall Vulnerability 
About 30 percent of LICs could be considered highly vulnerable to the consequences of 
global financial crisis (Table 1). About 50 percent of these highly vulnerable countries are 
in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The majority of the highly vulnerable countries face sizable 
declines in projected GDP, some in excess of 5 percent. About 60 percent of the countries are 
also found to be highly vulnerable to the simulated shock. More than half of the countries 
with high vulnerabilities resulting from the simulated shock are also in SSA (Table 2). 
Details on the individual channels that comprise the shock to the balance of payments are 
provided in the remainder of this appendix. 
Trade 
The analysis of the potential impact of the trade channel is summarized in one shock 
combining several commodities’ shock simulations together and in an alternative trade 
shock resulting from increased oil prices. In the combined shock, the commodities are oil, 
other commodities, food, other exports, and services exports. The shock simulations are a 
partial equilibrium exercise and the impact of all shocks affects exports through prices or 
volumes. The oil, other commodities, and food shocks are channeled through a decrease in 
international prices. The shock simulates a return of the prices from their average 2008 levels 
to their 1995–2007 averages. For manufactured exports and services, the impact of the crisis 
is expected to be channeled through a decrease in volumes. LICs are assumed to be price 
takers and the estimated drop in value as a result of the shock can be attributed entirely to the 
drop in the volume of exports resulting from lower global demand. The shocks are simulated 
as a 10 percent drop in the value of exports in line with an assumed drop in demand in 
trading partners. In LICs exports of services largely fall into two categories: transportation 
(e.g., for countries with an active port that act as regional hubs) and tourism. Tourism 
receipts are expected to be significant only in a handful of LICs, while the majority of 
services receipts are in the transport sector, i.e., trade-related. 
The combined trade shock (Table 3) points to the vulnerability of LICs in our sample to 
the trade channel, where about a fifth of all countries were found to be highly 
vulnerable. The overall vulnerability seems to reflect regional concentration in Africa, 
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where over 40 percent of the countries fall in the highly vulnerable group, and the country’s 
per capita income. Operating a fixed exchange rate regime seems to contribute to a country’s 
vulnerability, where a larger portion of LICs in that category (39 percent) appear to be highly 
vulnerable compared with the floaters (29 percent).  
The simulation of an increase in oil prices (Table 4) shifts most of the countries in our 
sample from the low-vulnerability category into that of high vulnerability, where about 
60 percent of LICs would fall. In this scenario, LICs in all regions are highly vulnerable, 
particularly oil importers. Contrary to the scenario where oil prices drop to historical average, 
the exchange rate arrangement does not appear to insulate the country from the impact of an 
increase in oil prices, where fixers and floaters appear equally vulnerable. The lowest per 
capita income category would be the hardest hit as over 70 percent of them become highly 
vulnerable.
Technical Summary 
Combined Trade Shock 
This combined trade shock adds all the below-mentioned shocks, including a decrease in 
international oil prices. 
? Oil Price Decrease: The shock simulates a return of the prices from their average 
2008 levels (US$97 per barrel) to their 1995–2007 average (US$32.5 per barrel). 
? Food Price Shock: The shock simulates a drop in food commodity prices from their 
2008 level to their 1995–2007 average level, about 35 percent on average. Consistent 
estimates of food imports/exports for all LICs are not directly available. Therefore, 
values of individual food commodity imports/exports for 2002–0439 are extrapolated 
using the change in each individual commodity price and real GDP growth to 
estimate food imports/exports in 2008. This methodology suffers shortcomings 
because it assumes commodity volumes are a linear function of GDP growth. 
However, it ensures a consistent definition of food imports across countries.40
? Non-oil, Non-food Commodities Shock41: The shock simulates a drop in commodity 
prices from their 2008 level to their 1995–2007 average level, about 52 percent lower 
39Computed by the IMF's Research Department based on WITS and desk data for the terms of trade exercise. 
40Note that food imports can be defined in many ways. This paper looks at food commodity imports and 
excludes processed or industrial food since the consumption of such products is likely to be small in LICs. The 
following commodities are included in our food definition: bananas, barley, beef, fish, fishmeal, groundnuts, 
lamb, maize, olive oil, oranges, palm oil, poultry, rapeseed oil, rice, shrimp, soy meal, soy oil, soybeans, sugar, 
sunflower/safflower oil, pork, and wheat. 
41Other commodities comprises coffee, cocoa, tea, hardwood log, hardwood sawn, softwood log, softwood 
sawn, cotton, wool, natural rubber, hides, aluminum, copper, lead, tin, zinc, iron, nickel, uranium, gold, natural 
gas, and coal. 
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on average. As for food imports/exports, we estimate non-oil commodity exports by 
extrapolating their 2002–04 values by the change in each individual commodity price 
and real GDP growth.  
? Drop in Other Exports: Other exports (non-food, non-commodity exports) include 
manufactured products. The shock simulates a 10 percent drop in value. 
? Services Shock: The shock simulates a 10 percent drop in value. 
? Total Trade Shock. The total trade shock adds all the above-mentioned shocks, 
including a decrease in international oil prices. 
Oil Price Increase
The shock simulates a 25 percent increase in oil prices from their average 2008 level (US$97 
per barrel), to about US$125 per barrel. 
Remittances 
The shock of a sudden reduction in remittances is calibrated for each region, and takes 
into account both direct and indirect effects on the balance of payments. For each region, 
the shock was calibrated as half of the decline that is necessary to reduce 2009 remittances to 
the average remittances during 2000–05. Then, within regions, the shock was applied 
uniformly to all countries. This implied a reduction of 36 percent for African LICs, 25 
percent for Asian LICs, 24 percent for European LICs, 28 percent for Middle East/Europe 
LICs, and 30 percent for Latin America LICs. By considering only half of the decline, 
instead of the total decline, the proposed methodology acknowledges that a reduction in 
remittances will not only lead to a direct worsening of the balance of payments and hence 
reserves, but also to an indirect improvement as remittances-related imports might decline. 
The simulations reveal that around 50 percent of LICs could face a vulnerable balance 
of payments situation as a result of a sudden decline in remittances (Table 5). Across
regions, Latin America would be most severely impacted, where almost 90 percent of LICs 
would have reserves under 3 months of imports. In the rest of the regions, except for Africa, 
20 percent of the countries would have reserves under 3 months of imports. In Africa, almost 
50 percent of the countries could be vulnerable under this metric. Out of all LICs in our 
sample, just 20 percent of them would lose reserves in excess of half a month worth of 
imports.
FDI 
A sudden reduction in FDI is assumed to have both direct and indirect effects on the 
balance of payments. The FDI simulations entail a shock reducing 2009 FDI to the average 
FDI during 2000–05, equivalent to a 30 percent reduction in 2008 FDI. The shock was 
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applied uniformly to all LICs in our sample. Given that a significant portion of FDI is often 
spent on imports, imports were also assumed to decline.42 Consequently, the balance of 
payments, and hence reserves, were worsened by the nominal amount of the FDI reduction 
and improved by the FDI-related import reduction. 
Over 50 percent of LICs could face a vulnerable balance of payments situation resulting 
from suddenly reduced FDI—a consequence of global financial crisis (Table 6). LICs in 
Latin America would be most severely impacted, where almost 90 percent of them would 
have reserves under 3 months of imports. In the rest of the world, 60 percent of LICs would 
face reserves under 3 months of imports. About 10 percent of Asia’s LICs would face a 
decline of over 0.5 month of imports.  
Aid 
A substantial decline in aid could result in a vulnerable balance of payments situation 
in over 50 percent of LICs (Table 7). The aid simulations for 2009 assume aid will be 
reduced by 30 percent relative to its 2008 value. This is equivalent to the average aid 
reduction for the three countries currently projecting the largest aid reductions for 2009. 
When aid is reduced by 30 percent, almost 90 percent of LICs in Latin America would have 
reserves under 3 months of imports. Meanwhile, 60 percent of LICs in the rest of the world 
would have reserves under 3 months of imports. Out of all LICs in our sample, over 40 
percent of them would lose reserves in excess of half a month of imports. 
42The marginal propensity of FDI-related imported expenditure is assumed to be 0.5. Consequently FDI-related 
imports are expected to decline relative to FDI-imports of 2008. No such offset is included for the other shocks. 
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Appendix V. Table 1. Vulnerability Table
Real GDP Growth Reserves (in Months of Imports)
2009?current less 
Spring WEO proj. 1/ 2009 less 2008 2/
Afghanistan, I.R. of -0.7 0.3
Albania -2.4 -0.7
Angola -8.6 -1.0
Armenia -5.0 -0.1
Azerbaijan -7.6 1.2
Bangladesh -1.2 0.0
Benin -2.0 -0.6
Bhutan -1.0 -0.2
Bolivia -1.0 -0.7
Burkina Faso -2.3 -0.6
Burundi -2.0 -0.6
Cambodia -2.2 -0.4
Cameroon -1.1 -0.7
Cape Verde -2.4 0.1
Central African Rep. -2.0 -0.9
Chad 1.1 -2.1
Comoros -2.2 -0.5
Congo, Dem. Rep. of -7.3 0.6
Congo, Republic of -0.3 -1.2
Côte d'Ivoire -0.7 0.0
Djibouti -1.5 0.2
Dominica -1.5 0.1
Eritrea -0.4 -0.1
Ethiopia -0.6 0.6
Gambia, The -0.5 -0.3
Georgia -6.5 0.5
Ghana -3.4 -1.2
Grenada -3.4 0.2
Guinea -1.1 0.5
Guinea-Bissau 0.0 0.7
Guyana 0.1 0.0
Haiti -1.5 -0.3
Honduras -2.6 -0.7
India -2.8 -1.0
Kenya -0.4 0.4
Kyrgyz Republic -4.6 -0.1
Lao People's Dem. Rep. -3.4 -0.9
Lesotho -3.3 -0.8
Liberia 0.7 0.0
Madagascar -2.2 0.5
Malawi 0.5 0.5
Maldives 2.5 0.8
Mali -0.7 0.1
Mauritania -2.8 -0.3
Moldova -4.5 -0.2
Mongolia -3.1 0.0
Mozambique -1.5 -0.1
Myanmar 1.0 0.7
Nepal 0.1 0.0
Nicaragua -2.7 0.1
Niger 0.0 -0.8
Nigeria -5.0 -3.9
Pakistan -4.7 0.4
Papua New Guinea 0.2 -0.9
Rwanda 0.4 -0.7
São Tomé & Príncipe -0.5 -0.4
Senegal -1.4 0.1
Sierra Leone -1.5 -0.1
Somalia . .
Sri Lanka -1.8 -0.2
St. Lucia -5.4 -0.1
St. Vincent & Grens. -4.7 -0.2
Sudan -6.7 0.2
Tajikistan -4.0 0.0
Tanzania -2.7 0.1
Togo -2.0 -0.3
Uganda -1.0 -0.6
Uzbekistan -0.5 0.8
Vietnam -2.5 -0.9
Yemen, Republic of -0.5 -1.6
Zambia -2.4 0.2
All LICs -2.1 -0.3 15 H 47 M 8 L 26 H 31 M 13 L
SSA -1.8 -0.2 9 H 24 M 3 L 11 H 19 M 6 L
Asia -1.4 -0.2 2 H 10 M 2 L 4 H 6 M 4 L
Middle East/Europe -3.6 0.0 3 H 6 M 2 L 7 H 2 M 2 L
Latin America -2.5 -0.2 1 H 7 M 1 L 4 H 4 M 1 L
Net oil importers -1.9 -0.1 10 H 39 M 5 L 18 H 26 M 10 L
Net oil exporters -2.8 -0.7 5 H 8 M 3 L 8 H 5 M 3 L
Countries with top 25% per 
capita income -3.2 -0.1 0 H 16 M 1 L 7 H 8 M 2 L
Countries with mid 50% 
per capita income -2.2 -0.5 10 H 20 M 5 L 16 H 13 M 6 L
Countries with bottom 25% 
per capita income -0.9 0.0 5 H 11 M 2 L 3 H 10 M 5 L
1/ Current projection for 2009 less Spring WEO projection for 2009
2/ Current projection for 2009 less 2008 actual.
3/ Combined Shock: Trade, Remittances, Aid, FDI. See section IV for description of shocks and Appendix V tables for magnitudes 
of individual shocks.
4/ H = High risk; M=Medium risk; L=Low risk.
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
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Appendix V. Table 2. Simulations' Vulnerability Table 1/
Shocks: Vulnerability Ratings
Trade FDI Aid Remittances
Afghanistan, I.R. of M L H H
Albania L L L M
Angola H L L L
Armenia L L L H
Azerbaijan H L L L
Bangladesh L M M H
Benin L L L L
Bhutan L L L L
Bolivia L L L L
Burkina Faso L L M L
Burundi L L H L
Cambodia L M M M
Cameroon H L L L
Cape Verde L M H M
Central African Rep. H M M M
Chad H L L L
Comoros L L M M
Congo, Dem. Rep. of H M M M
Congo, Republic of H L L L
Côte d'Ivoire H M M M
Djibouti M H M M
Dominica L M H M
Eritrea L M M H
Ethiopia M M H M
Gambia, The L L L L
Georgia M M M M
Ghana M M M M
Grenada L M M M
Guinea H M M H
Guinea-Bissau L L M M
Guyana L M M H
Haiti L L H H
Honduras L M M H
India L L L L
Kenya L M M M
Kyrgyz Republic L L L H
Lao People's Dem. Rep. L H M M
Lesotho L L M L
Liberia H M M H
Madagascar L M H M
Malawi M M H M
Maldives L M M M
Mali M L L L
Mauritania H M M M
Moldova L L L H
Mongolia M M M M
Mozambique L L H L
Myanmar M L L L
Nepal L L L M
Nicaragua L M M H
Niger M L M L
Nigeria M L L L
Pakistan L M M M
Papua New Guinea H L L L
Rwanda L L M L
São Tomé & Príncipe L L M L
Senegal L M M H
Sierra Leone L L H L
Somalia . . . .
Sri Lanka M M M M
St. Lucia M M M M
St. Vincent & Grens. M M M M
Sudan H M H H
Tajikistan M M M H
Tanzania L L M L
Togo L L M H
Uganda L L L L
Uzbekistan L L L L
Vietnam H L M L
Yemen, Republic of L L L L
Zambia H M M M
All LICs M M M M 15 H 47 M 8 L
SSA M L M M 9 H 24 M 3 L
Asia M M M M 2 H 10 M 2 L
Middle East/Europe M L L M 3 H 6 M 2 L
Latin America L M M M 1 H 7 M 1 L
Net oil importers L M M M 10 H 39 M 5 L
Net oil exporters M L L L 5 H 8 M 3 L
Fixed XR M L M M 5 H 29 M 5 L
Flexible XR M M M M 9 H 18 M 3 L
Countries with top 25% per 
capita income
M M M M 0 H 16 M 1 L
Countries with mid 50% per 
capita income
M M M M 10 H 20 M 5 L
Countries with bottom 25% 
per capita income
M L M M 5 H 11 M 2 L
1/ H = High risk; M=Medium risk; L=Low risk.
2/ The total vulnerability score combines the ratings for each of the four simulated shocks, placing equal 
weight on each shock.
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
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Vulnerable 
(IR<3)
Vulnerable     
(IR drop >0.5)
2008 proj. 2009 proj. 2009 simul. 2008 proj. 2009 simul. 2009 simul. 2009 simul.
Afghanistan, I.S. of -2.8 -2.3 -4.6 3.2 2.9 1  
Albania -10.0 -7.5 -8.5 4.2 4.9   
Angola 5.8 1.3 -71.0 4.1 -10.2 1 1
Armenia -13.7 -12.9 -14.8 3.3 3.1   
Azerbaijan 30.9 10.9 -15.1 6.4 -12.5 1 1
Bangladesh 0.7 0.5 1.6 3.0 3.7   
Benin -9.6 -8.3 -6.7 7.3 10.0   
Bhutan 11.7 2.8 9.2 13.3 13.4   
Bolivia 11.0 -4.3 5.6 15.7 13.9  1
Burkina Faso -11.3 -9.5 -8.3 5.5 7.9   
Burundi -12.5 -8.0 -10.7 3.7 4.7   
Cambodia -11.9 -7.1 -5.4 3.0 4.7   
Cameroon 0.4 -5.4 -10.0 6.5 2.7 1 1
Cape Verde -13.0 -12.7 -12.6 3.0 3.3   
Central African Rep. -8.7 -7.2 -13.7 2.9 0.6 1 1
Chad -9.5 -19.6 -56.5 4.6 -2.8 1 1
Comoros -8.7 -8.3 -2.5 6.0 9.6   
Congo, Dem. Rep. of -12.4 -19.8 -18.6 0.5 -0.3 1 1
Congo, Republic of -0.8 -18.1 -69.8 7.2 0.3 1 1
Côte d'Ivoire 0.1 -2.6 -11.6 2.5 -0.2 1 1
Djibouti -38.2 -14.0 -35.2 2.2 2.7 1  
Dominica -30.1 -24.4 -27.7 2.9 3.6   
Eritrea -2.7 1.1 4.2 0.9 4.9   
Ethiopia -5.8 -5.9 -3.4 1.3 2.5 1  
Gambia, The -13.9 -12.5 -13.7 4.8 5.2   
Georgia -21.8 -17.7 -21.1 2.2 2.5 1  
Ghana -20.2 -15.9 -19.2 1.6 2.0 1  
Grenada -31.8 -31.8 -27.7 3.0 4.0   
Guinea -4.1 -2.6 -9.3 1.3 -0.2 1 1
Guinea-Bissau 0.2 -11.6 7.3 6.0 9.7   
Guyana -20.8 -18.1 -23.9 2.8 3.1   
Haiti -2.6 -4.4 2.7 3.2 5.9   
Honduras -13.3 -8.3 -11.1 2.7 3.3   
India -2.5 -1.8 -2.2 9.4 10.7   
Kenya -6.6 -2.7 -2.4 2.9 5.0   
Kyrgyz Republic -6.0 -6.5 -7.0 3.2 3.6   
Lao People's Dem. Rep -15.1 -11.9 -15.2 3.0 3.3   
Lesotho -3.7 -8.5 -1.4 6.3 7.1   
Liberia -31.8 -42.2 -50.8 0.7 0.2 1 1
Madagascar -22.6 -14.8 -20.0 2.3 3.1   
Malawi -8.0 -4.6 -5.6 0.9 1.6 1  
Maldives -46.0 -30.1 -33.1 2.7 4.4   
Mali -6.1 -6.2 -10.1 4.6 4.0  1
Mauritania -6.1 -8.6 -77.8 0.9 -6.2 1 1
Moldova -18.9 -19.2 -17.1 3.3 3.8   
Mongolia -9.2 -7.1 -10.5 1.9 2.1 1  
Mozambique -12.7 -11.8 -13.0 4.8 5.4   
Myanmar 3.3 1.3 0.0 6.3 4.7  1
Nepal 2.6 3.3 4.4 7.4 9.1   
Nicaragua -23.6 -17.7 -18.9 2.5 3.4   
Niger -9.9 -22.6 -14.8 5.6 4.7  1
Nigeria 5.0 -10.7 -16.1 12.8 5.2  1
Pakistan -8.4 -4.7 -6.2 2.2 3.5   
Papua New Guinea 3.2 -5.5 -46.2 5.1 -1.5 1 1
Rwanda -6.9 -7.6 -5.3 5.9 7.3   
São Tomé & Príncipe -34.0 -43.0 -24.0 5.5 7.9   
Senegal -12.4 -10.4 -9.5 3.1 4.2   
Sierra Leone -6.8 -4.5 -1.6 3.5 7.9   
Somalia . . . . .   
Sri Lanka -7.7 -5.9 -5.1 1.2 2.1 1  
St. Lucia -29.5 -23.7 -29.6 2.2 2.3 1  
St. Vincent & Grens. -34.1 -28.4 -34.1 2.4 2.6 1  
Sudan -7.0 -10.0 -23.9 1.2 -6.6 1 1
Tajikistan -8.9 -8.6 -7.4 0.6 0.8 1  
Tanzania -9.9 -8.6 -8.3 5.6 7.4   
Togo -7.0 -6.4 4.6 3.1 7.2   
Uganda -6.1 -7.9 -6.1 8.1 8.7   
Uzbekistan 13.5 7.3 5.3 10.6 7.7  1
Vietnam -10.3 -8.2 -20.3 3.6 2.5 1 1
Yemen, Republic of -2.1 -2.8 -16.8 10.2 6.3  1
Zambia -8.9 -8.3 -15.6 2.6 0.7 1 1
All LICs -9.6 -10.2 -15.2 4.3 3.6 26 22 15 H 15 M 40 L
SSA -8.9 -11.0 -16.8 4.1 3.6 14 14 11 H 6 M 19 L
Asia -6.6 -5.5 -9.5 4.7 4.7 5 3 2 H 4 M 8 L
Middle East/Europe -6.4 -6.3 -13.6 4.5 1.8 5 4 2 H 3 M 6 L
Latin America -19.4 -17.9 -18.3 4.1 4.7 2 1 0 H 2 M 7 L
Net oil importers -12.7 -11.3 -11.5 3.7 4.6 15 7 4 H 14 M 36 L
Net oil exporters 0.8 -6.5 -27.8 6.1 0.5 11 15 11 H 1 M 4 L
Countries with top 
25% per capita 
income
-13.7 -13.6 -23.9 3.8 1.9 8 3 3 H 5 M 9 L
Countries with mid 
50% per capita 
income
-8.0 -8.7 -14.6 4.7 3.8 13 15 10 H 5 M 20 L
Countries with bottom 
25% per capita 
income
-8.7 -9.8 -8.2 3.8 5.0 5.0 4 2 H 5 M 11 L
1/ The combined trade shock simulates for 2009 a return of commodities prices from their end-2008 levels to their 1995-2007 averages, 
and a 10 percent decline in the 2008 value of other exports and services.
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
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Appendix V. Table 3: Combined Trade Shock 1/
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Vulnerable 
(IR<3)
2008 proj. 2009 proj. 2009 simul. 2008 proj. 2009 simul. 2009 simul. 2009 simul.
Afghanistan, I.R. of -2.8 -2.3 -4.6 3.2 2.9 1  
Albania -10.0 -7.5 -14.0 4.2 3.2  1
Angola 5.8 1.3 41.4 4.1 9.6   
Armenia -13.7 -12.9 -16.2 3.3 2.6 1 1
Azerbaijan 30.9 10.9 75.3 6.4 13.3   
Bangladesh 0.7 0.5 -0.8 3.0 2.4 1 1
Benin -9.6 -8.3 -11.5 7.3 6.1  1
Bhutan 11.7 2.8 4.9 13.3 11.4  1
Bolivia 11.0 -4.3 4.6 15.7 13.2  1
Burkina Faso -11.3 -9.5 -13.0 5.5 4.4  1
Burundi -12.5 -8.0 -18.8 3.7 1.8 1 1
Cambodia -11.9 -7.1 -21.5 3.0 1.2 1 1
Cameroon 0.4 -5.4 1.4 6.5 7.1   
Cape Verde -13.0 -12.7 -18.6 3.0 2.0 1 1
Central African Rep. -8.7 -7.2 -8.8 2.9 3.1   
Chad -9.5 -19.6 1.2 4.6 7.2   
Comoros -8.7 -8.3 -7.5 6.0 6.8   
Congo, Dem. Rep. of -12.4 -19.8 -18.5 0.5 -0.3 1 1
Congo, Republic of -0.8 -18.1 23.3 7.2 9.9   
Côte d'Ivoire 0.1 -2.6 -6.5 2.5 1.1 1 1
Djibouti -38.2 -14.0 -44.4 2.2 1.2 1 1
Dominica -30.1 -24.4 -36.6 2.9 1.6 1 1
Eritrea -2.7 1.1 -5.8 0.9 -0.4 1 1
Ethiopia -5.8 -5.9 -9.0 1.3 0.0 1 1
Gambia, The -13.9 -12.5 -18.2 4.8 3.7  1
Georgia -21.8 -17.7 -26.4 2.2 1.2 1 1
Ghana -20.2 -15.9 -31.0 1.6 -0.2 1 1
Grenada -31.8 -31.8 -37.0 3.0 1.8 1 1
Guinea -4.1 -2.6 -17.1 1.3 -2.4 1 1
Guinea-Bissau 0.2 -11.6 -1.2 6.0 5.9   
Guyana -20.8 -18.1 -56.0 2.8 -0.3 1 1
Haiti -2.6 -4.4 -4.7 3.2 2.5 1 1
Honduras -13.3 -8.3 -22.2 2.7 1.3 1 1
India -2.5 -1.8 -6.2 9.4 7.6  1
Kenya -6.6 -2.7 -11.3 2.9 1.3 1 1
Kyrgyz Republic -6.0 -6.5 -23.4 3.2 1.1 1 1
Lao People's Dem. Rep. -15.1 -11.9 -22.5 3.0 1.1 1 1
Lesotho -3.7 -8.5 -7.9 6.3 5.9   
Liberia -31.8 -42.2 -67.4 0.7 -0.5 1 1
Madagascar -22.6 -14.8 -25.3 2.3 1.6 1 1
Malawi -8.0 -4.6 -11.7 0.9 -0.2 1 1
Maldives -46.0 -30.1 -55.9 2.7 1.1 1 1
Mali -6.1 -6.2 -17.6 4.6 0.7 1 1
Mauritania -6.1 -8.6 -38.1 0.9 -2.0 1 1
Moldova -18.9 -19.2 -26.2 3.3 2.3 1 1
Mongolia -9.2 -7.1 -29.4 1.9 -1.0 1 1
Mozambique -12.7 -11.8 -18.2 4.8 3.2  1
Myanmar 3.3 1.3 0.0 6.3 4.7  1
Nepal 2.6 3.3 0.3 7.4 6.4  1
Nicaragua -23.6 -17.7 -32.7 2.5 1.0 1 1
Niger -9.9 -22.6 -18.9 5.6 2.6 1 1
Nigeria 5.0 -10.7 14.9 12.8 16.6   
Pakistan -8.4 -4.7 -10.9 2.2 0.9 1 1
Papua New Guinea 3.2 -5.5 -26.4 5.1 1.1 1 1
Rwanda -6.9 -7.6 -9.0 5.9 4.9  1
São Tomé & Príncipe -34.0 -43.0 -37.4 5.5 4.3  1
Senegal -12.4 -10.4 -14.1 3.1 2.5 1 1
Sierra Leone -6.8 -4.5 -10.9 3.5 1.5 1 1
Somalia . . . . .   
Sri Lanka -7.7 -5.9 -12.0 1.2 -0.1 1 1
St. Lucia -29.5 -23.7 -37.3 2.2 1.0 1 1
St. Vincent & Grens. -34.1 -28.4 -41.9 2.4 1.0 1 1
Sudan -7.0 -10.0 -2.2 1.2 4.2   
Tajikistan -8.9 -8.6 -14.4 0.6 -0.3 1 1
Tanzania -9.9 -8.6 -15.7 5.6 3.4  1
Togo -7.0 -6.4 -15.2 3.1 1.1 1 1
Uganda -6.1 -7.9 -9.6 8.1 6.6  1
Uzbekistan 13.5 7.3 5.3 10.6 7.7  1
Vietnam -10.3 -8.2 -20.0 3.6 2.6 1 1
Yemen, Republic of -2.1 -2.8 4.5 10.2 13.0   
Zambia -8.9 -8.3 -20.5 2.6 -0.8 1 1
All LICs -9.6 -10.2 -14.3 4.3 3.3 43 57 42 H 9 M 19 L
SSA -8.9 -11.0 -12.6 4.1 3.3 19 27 19 H 6 M 11 L
Asia -6.6 -5.5 -14.6 4.7 3.0 10 13 9 H 2 M 3 L
Middle East/Europe -6.4 -6.3 -5.9 4.5 4.7 6 8 6 H 1 M 4 L
Latin America -19.4 -17.9 -29.3 4.1 2.6 8 9 8 H 0 M 1 L
Net oil importers -12.7 -11.3 -19.6 3.7 2.3 38 50 37 H 9 M 8 L
Net oil exporters 0.8 -6.5 3.3 6.1 6.9 5 7 5 H 0 M 11 L
Countries with top 25% 
per capita income -13.7 -13.6 -15.2 3.8 3.5 1 14 12 H 1 M 4 L
Countries with mid 50% 
per capita income -8.0 -8.7 -13.8 4.7 3.6 1 27 20 H 3 M 12 L
Countries with bottom 
25% per capita income -8.7 -9.8 -14.6 3.8 2.5 1 16 10 H 5 M 3 L
1/ The combined trade shock simulates for 2009 a 25 percent increase in oil prices, a return of commodities prices from their end-2008 levels 
to their 1995-2007 averages, and a 10 percent decline in the 2008 value of other exports and services.
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
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2008 proj. 2009 proj. 2009 simul. 2009 proj. 2009 simul. 2009 simul. 2009 simul.
Afghanistan, I.R. of 3/ 56.8 45.4 48.6 3.5 0.7 1 1
Albania 11.5 9.1 9.0 4.4 3.6  1
Angola 0.3 0.3 0.2 3.6 4.0   
Armenia 2/ 11.0 . 8.1 3.8 2.4 1 1
Azerbaijan 2.6 2.9 1.9 8.0 6.1   
Bangladesh 9.7 10.7 7.5 3.1 2.0 1 1
Benin 3.1 3.0 2.0 7.2 6.8  1
Bhutan 3/ -6.8 . -6.8 13.9 13.3   
Bolivia 5.1 4.7 3.6 14.6 15.1  1
Burkina Faso 0.8 0.9 0.5 6.1 5.4   
Burundi 3/ 3.2 . 2.1 4.0 3.3   
Cambodia 2/ 3.3 . 2.5 3.1 2.8 1  
Cameroon 2/ 0.7 . 0.5 6.2 6.4   
Cape Verde 6.9 6.1 4.5 3.4 2.6 1  
Central African Rep. -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 2.9 2.9 1  
Chad 2.6 3.1 1.7 3.6 4.4   
Comoros 21.2 20.8 14.6 6.8 3.9  1
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 1.8 . 1.2 1.4 0.4 1  
Congo, Republic of 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.6 7.2   
Côte d'Ivoire -2.6 -2.9 -2.6 3.1 2.5 1  
Djibouti -4.0 -3.7 -4.0 3.8 2.2 1  
Dominica 8.0 8.0 5.7 3.1 2.5 1  
Eritrea 3/ 20.7 . 14.3 1.1 -1.9 1 1
Ethiopia 2/ 1.4 . 0.9 1.8 1.1 1  
Gambia, The 1.1 1.1 0.7 4.5 4.7   
Georgia 5.7 5.7 4.2 3.4 1.9 1  
Ghana 2/ 0.7 . 0.5 0.6 1.5 1  
Grenada 4.1 3.2 2.9 3.3 2.8 1  
Guinea 7.0 6.6 4.6 2.2 0.5 1 1
Guinea-Bissau 7.5 6.0 4.9 7.1 5.4  1
Guyana 26.8 21.1 20.4 3.2 2.0 1 1
Haiti 19.3 16.0 14.3 2.9 1.5 1 1
Honduras 19.4 15.9 14.3 2.5 1.8 1 1
India 2/ 2.5 . 1.9 9.4 9.2   
Kenya 3.3 3.2 2.1 4.0 2.5 1  
Kyrgyz Republic 27.9 21.0 21.8 3.8 2.3 1 1
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 2/ 0.0 . 0.0 2.6 3.0 1  
Lesotho 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.0 6.3   
Liberia 2/ 86.5 . 80.4 0.7 -0.7 1 1
Madagascar 0.3 0.2 0.2 3.2 2.3 1  
Malawi 2/ 0.0 . 0.0 1.4 0.9 1  
Maldives 2/ 0.2 . 0.2 3.6 2.7 1  
Mali 2/ 2.5 . 1.6 5.3 4.2   
Mauritania 2.1 2.3 1.5 0.9 0.8 1  
Moldova 17.1 14.4 13.6 3.3 2.8 1 1
Mongolia 1.7 1.3 1.3 2.6 1.8 1  
Mozambique 2/ 1.0 . 0.7 4.9 4.7   
Myanmar 2/ 0.6 . 0.4 6.9 6.2   
Nepal 16.4 16.9 12.9 7.7 5.9  1
Nicaragua 12.9 11.8 9.4 3.0 1.9 1 1
Niger 2/ 1.5 . 1.0 3.7 5.4   
Nigeria 1.6 2.1 1.0 11.1 12.6   
Pakistan 4.0 4.4 2.9 2.8 1.7 1  
Papua New Guinea 0.5 0.1 0.4 5.2 5.1   
Rwanda 0.9 0.9 0.6 5.1 5.8   
São Tomé & Príncipe 1.7 1.9 1.1 3.8 5.4   
Senegal 8.2 6.8 5.4 4.0 2.3 1 1
Sierra Leone 0.7 0.7 0.4 4.0 3.4   
Somalia . . . . .   
Sri Lanka 7.4 7.0 5.7 1.3 0.7 1  
St. Lucia 2/ 3.0 . 2.1 2.1 2.0 1  
St. Vincent & Grens. 2.8 2.7 2.0 2.6 2.2 1  
Sudan 2/ 3.1 . 2.3 1.7 0.7 1 1
Tajikistan 45.1 38.6 37.1 0.5 -1.3 1 1
Tanzania 2/ 0.1 . 0.0 5.8 5.6   
Togo 16.2 13.5 11.0 3.5 2.0 1 1
Uganda 2/ 6.0 . 3.9 7.2 7.2  1
Uzbekistan 3/ 7.6 3.8 5.6 13.0 9.9  1
Vietnam 2/ 6.1 . 4.7 4.1 3.4   
Yemen, Republic of 5.2 3.8 3.8 12.8 9.7  1
Zambia 2/ 0.4 . 0.3 3.4 2.6 1  
All LICs 7.8 7.4 6.0 4.5 3.8 39 25 16 H 27 M 27 L
SSA 5.8 2.1 4.5 4.2 3.7 15 9 5 H 12 M 18 L
Asia 7.3 6.1 5.9 5.0 4.2 6 2 1 H 6 M 5 L
Middle East/Europe 11.1 8.0 8.6 4.9 3.4 9 7 5 H 4 M 3 L
Latin America 11.3 9.3 8.3 4.1 3.5 8 5 4 H 4 M 1 L
Net oil importers 9.0 8.8 7.1 4.0 3.2 35 20 15 H 23 M 16 L
Net oil exporters 3.6 3.4 2.5 6.5 5.8 4 5 1 H 4 M 11 L
Countries with top 25% per 
capita income 6.2 6.4 4.4 4.3 3.5 12.0 4.0 3 H 10 M 4 L
Countries with mid 50% per 
capita income
6.2 6.9 4.6 4.9 4.2 19.0 14.0 9 H 11 M 15 L
Countries with bottom 25% per 
capita income 12.4 10.6 10.2 4.0 3.2 8.0 7.0 4 H 6 M 8 M
1/ Remittances are reduced by regionally calibrated amounts, averaging 34 percent, to obtain 2009 simulations.
2/ The projection of remittances for 2008 is from the World Bank (2008), since it was not available from Fund staff. 
3/ As remittances data are not available, the projection for 2008 corresponds to private current transfers from World Economic Outlook.
Sources: WEO database, Fund staff calculations, and World Bank.
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Appendix V. Table 5. Reduced remittances 1/
Vulnerability Rating
2009 simul.
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2008 proj. 2009 proj. 2009 simul. 2008 proj. 2009 simul. 2009 simul. 2009 simul.
Afghanistan, I.R. of 2.4 3.2 1.7 3.2 3.1   
Albania 4.9 4.6 3.5 4.2 4.1   
Angola 9.5 . 6.8 4.1 3.7   
Armenia 6.6 6.2 4.7 3.3 3.1   
Azerbaijan -4.1 -1.8 -4.1 6.4 6.4   
Bangladesh 0.8 0.8 0.6 3.0 3.0 1  
Benin 3.1 2.0 2.2 7.3 7.2   
Bhutan 0.9 0.9 0.7 13.3 13.3   
Bolivia 2.4 3.0 1.7 15.7 15.7   
Burkina Faso 2.2 1.0 1.5 5.5 5.4   
Burundi 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.7 3.7   
Cambodia 7.4 4.1 5.2 3.0 2.8 1  
Cameroon 1.7 2.8 1.2 6.5 6.4   
Cape Verde 9.8 7.8 7.0 3.0 2.8 1  
Central African Rep. 5.1 5.1 3.6 2.9 2.6 1  
Chad 14.3 9.9 10.2 4.6 4.3   
Comoros 1.6 1.5 1.1 6.0 6.0   
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 14.5 5.6 10.4 0.5 0.2 1  
Congo, Republic of 23.3 21.5 16.9 7.2 6.9   
Côte d'Ivoire 2.2 2.6 1.5 2.5 2.4 1  
Djibouti 31.4 9.8 23.0 2.2 1.6 1 1
Dominica 14.3 12.1 10.2 2.9 2.6 1  
Eritrea 2.4 3.6 1.7 0.9 0.8 1  
Ethiopia 3.2 1.9 2.2 1.3 1.2 1  
Gambia, The 9.0 8.0 6.4 4.8 4.6   
Georgia 9.7 7.7 6.9 2.2 1.9 1  
Ghana 6.0 5.0 4.2 1.6 1.5 1  
Grenada 19.2 21.8 13.8 3.0 2.6 1  
Guinea 2.5 2.2 1.7 1.3 1.2 1  
Guinea-Bissau 2.9 2.8 2.0 6.0 6.0   
Guyana 13.4 11.4 9.6 2.8 2.6 1  
Haiti 0.4 0.3 0.3 3.2 3.2   
Honduras 7.4 4.0 5.2 2.7 2.6 1  
India 1.6 1.2 1.1 9.4 9.4   
Kenya 2.7 3.3 1.9 2.9 2.8 1  
Kyrgyz Republic 6.1 4.2 4.3 3.2 3.1   
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 18.5 16.5 13.3 3.0 2.4 1 1
Lesotho 5.4 3.9 3.8 6.3 6.3   
Liberia 23.5 42.8 17.1 0.7 0.6 1  
Madagascar 7.6 2.7 5.4 2.3 2.1 1  
Malawi 5.2 2.9 3.7 0.9 0.7 1  
Maldives 20.5 18.5 14.8 2.7 2.5 1  
Mali 1.4 1.1 1.0 4.6 4.5   
Mauritania 2.0 4.1 1.4 0.9 0.9 1  
Moldova 11.1 9.5 7.9 3.3 3.2   
Mongolia 12.6 7.0 9.0 1.9 1.7 1  
Mozambique 4.7 4.7 3.3 4.8 4.6   
Myanmar 0.9 0.9 0.6 6.3 6.3   
Nepal 0.0 0.2 0.0 7.4 7.4   
Nicaragua 7.1 6.1 5.0 2.5 2.3 1  
Niger 8.1 13.4 5.7 5.6 5.4   
Nigeria 2.2 3.9 1.6 12.8 12.8   
Pakistan 3.0 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.0 1  
Papua New Guinea 1.4 1.3 0.9 5.1 5.1   
Rwanda 2.4 1.7 1.7 5.9 5.8   
São Tomé & Príncipe 33.5 11.4 24.7 5.5 5.0   
Senegal 4.5 3.8 3.2 3.1 3.0 1  
Sierra Leone 2.5 1.1 1.8 3.5 3.4   
Somalia . . . . .   
Sri Lanka 1.5 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.1 1  
St. Lucia 17.5 20.3 12.6 2.2 1.8 1  
St. Vincent & Grens. 16.6 14.7 11.9 2.4 2.0 1  
Sudan 3.8 5.0 2.7 1.2 0.9 1  
Tajikistan 3.7 1.9 2.6 0.6 0.5 1  
Tanzania 3.5 3.9 2.5 5.6 5.5   
Togo 3.0 4.1 2.1 3.1 3.0   
Uganda 6.5 5.4 4.6 8.1 7.9   
Uzbekistan 2.7 2.9 1.9 10.6 10.6   
Vietnam 8.7 4.5 6.1 3.6 3.5   
Yemen, Republic of 1.8 0.8 1.2 10.2 10.2   
Zambia 4.4 1.9 3.1 2.6 2.4 1  
All LICs 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 4.1 33 2 2 H 31 M 37 L
SSA 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.1 4.0 14 0 0 H 15 M 21 L
Asia 5.7 4.4 4.1 4.7 4.5 6 1 1 H 6 M 7 L
Middle East/Europe 6.5 4.2 4.6 4.0 3.8 6 1 1 H 3 M 7 L
Latin America 10.9 10.4 7.8 4.1 3.9 7 0 0 H 7 M 2 L
Net oil importers 7.5 6.3 5.4 3.7 3.6 29 2 2 H 27 M 25 L
Net oil exporters 5.5 4.5 3.8 6.1 6.0 4 0 0 H 4 M 12 L
Countries with top 25% 
per capita income
10.8 9.8 7.7 3.8 3.6 11.0 0.0 0 H 11 M 6 L
Countries with mid 50% 
per capita income
6.0 4.1 4.3 4.7 4.6 16.0 2.0 2 H 14 M 19 L
Countries with bottom 
25% per capita income
5.5 5.8 3.9 3.8 3.7 6.0 0.0 0 H 6 M 12 L
1/ FDI is reduced by 30 percent of its 2008 value to obtain 2009 simulations.
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
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2008 proj. 2009 proj. 2009 simul. 2008 proj. 2009 simul. 2009 simul. 2009 simul.
Afghanistan, I.R. of 2/ 24.5 . 18.5 3.2 2.0 1 1
Albania 2.7 2.2 1.9 4.2 4.0   
Angola 2/ 0.1 . 0.1 4.1 4.0   
Armenia 0.5 . 0.4 3.3 3.2   
Azerbaijan 0.8 2.4 0.5 6.4 6.3   
Bangladesh 1.2 1.7 0.9 3.0 2.9 1  
Benin 8.3 7.4 6.0 7.3 6.2  1
Bhutan 11.0 . 8.0 13.3 12.5  1
Bolivia 1.2 1.1 0.9 15.7 15.5   
Burkina Faso 7.9 . 5.7 5.5 4.4  1
Burundi 17.8 . 13.2 3.7 2.3 1 1
Cambodia 6.4 6.4 4.6 3.0 2.7 1  
Cameroon 0.1 0.9 0.0 6.5 6.5   
Cape Verde 10.3 14.3 7.4 3.0 2.5 1 1
Central African Rep. 2.2 1.9 1.6 2.9 2.6 1  
Chad 0.4 1.4 0.3 4.6 4.6   
Comoros 9.1 6.1 6.6 6.0 5.3  1
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 6.4 . 4.6 0.5 0.2 1  
Congo, Republic of 2/ 0.4 . 0.3 7.2 7.1   
Côte d'Ivoire 0.6 0.4 0.4 2.5 2.4 1  
Djibouti 10.0 10.2 7.2 2.2 1.8 1  
Dominica 14.0 13.1 10.3 2.9 2.2 1 1
Eritrea 1.8 . 1.3 0.9 0.7 1  
Ethiopia 5.2 . 3.7 1.3 0.7 1 1
Gambia, The 1.3 7.5 0.9 4.8 4.7   
Georgia 6.3 9.5 4.5 2.2 1.8 1  
Ghana 7.5 . 5.4 1.6 1.2 1  
Grenada 6.8 5.5 4.8 3.0 2.6 1  
Guinea 3.3 2.2 2.3 1.3 1.0 1  
Guinea-Bissau 21.4 20.8 16.0 6.0 4.6  1
Guyana 17.6 18.2 13.0 2.8 2.3 1  
Haiti 10.5 8.0 7.6 3.2 2.3 1 1
Honduras 3.2 2.2 2.3 2.7 2.5 1  
India 0.0 . 0.0 9.4 9.4   
Kenya 0.8 . 0.6 2.9 2.8 1  
Kyrgyz Republic 3.6 4.7 2.6 3.2 3.1   
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 4.5 . 3.2 3.0 2.7 1  
Lesotho 38.2 . 30.2 6.3 5.1  1
Liberia 2/ 26.6 . 20.3 0.7 0.4 1  
Madagascar 9.9 9.1 7.1 2.3 1.7 1 1
Malawi 11.6 16.6 8.4 0.9 -0.1 1 1
Maldives 2.7 . 1.9 2.7 2.6 1  
Mali 3.3 . 2.3 4.6 4.2   
Mauritania 8.5 9.3 6.1 0.9 0.5 1  
Moldova 1.5 2.4 1.0 3.3 3.3   
Mongolia 4.6 . 3.2 1.9 1.7 1  
Mozambique 42.8 . 34.3 4.8 1.1 1 1
Myanmar 0.1 . 0.1 6.3 6.3   
Nepal 2.1 3.5 1.5 7.4 7.2   
Nicaragua 11.5 11.1 8.4 2.5 2.0 1  
Niger 7.4 12.0 5.3 5.6 4.8  1
Nigeria 2/ 0.7 . 0.5 12.8 12.7   
Pakistan 0.6 . 0.4 2.2 2.1 1  
Papua New Guinea 1.7 3.9 1.2 5.1 5.0   
Rwanda 17.6 16.0 13.0 5.9 3.8  1
São Tomé & Príncipe 26.5 41.5 20.1 5.5 4.2  1
Senegal 5.4 5.0 3.8 3.1 2.7 1  
Sierra Leone 6.3 6.3 4.5 3.5 2.7 1 1
Somalia . . . . .   
Sri Lanka 3.6 . 2.6 1.2 0.9 1  
St. Lucia 0.3 . 0.2 2.2 2.2 1  
St. Vincent & Grens. 5.3 6.0 3.8 2.4 2.1 1  
Sudan 4.8 . 3.4 1.2 0.4 1 1
Tajikistan 1.8 . 1.3 0.6 0.5 1  
Tanzania 10.7 . 7.8 5.6 4.5  1
Togo 2.1 3.5 1.5 3.1 3.0 1  
Uganda 4.9 . 3.5 8.1 7.5  1
Uzbekistan 0.4 . 0.3 10.6 10.6   
Vietnam 2/ 15.6 . 11.5 3.6 3.0  1
Yemen, Republic of 1.1 2.0 0.7 10.2 10.1   
Zambia 4.5 6.0 3.2 2.6 2.2 1  
All LICs 7.3 7.7 5.4 4.3 3.8 39 23 11 H 37 M 22 L
SSA 9.2 5.2 6.9 4.1 3.5 18 17 7 H 20 M 9 L
Asia 5.6 1.1 4.1 4.7 4.4 6 2 1 H 8 M 5 L
Middle East/Europe 2.8 2.8 2.0 4.0 3.8 7 2 1 H 3 M 7 L
Latin America 7.8 7.2 5.7 4.1 3.7 8 2 2 H 6 M 1 L
Net oil importers 8.6 9.2 6.4 3.7 3.2 35 20 10 H 32 M 12 L
Net oil exporters 3.2 3.1 2.3 6.1 5.9 4 3 1 H 5 M 10 L
Countries with top 25% 
per capita income
5.3 8.2 3.8 3.8 3.6 11.0 3.0 2 H 9 M 6 L
Countries with mid 50% 
per capita income
6.1 6.4 4.5 4.7 4.3 17.0 9.0 2 H 21 M 12 L
Countries with bottom 
25% per capita income
11.7 10.6 8.8 3.8 3.0 11.0 11.0 7 H 7 M 4 L
1/ Aid is reduced by 30 percent of its 2008 value to obtain 2009 simulations.
2/ Aid data for 2008 is estimated from the OECD Development Assistance Committee aid database.
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations.
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Appendix V. Table 7. Reduced Aid 1/
H
Vulnerability Rating
2009 simul.
Vulnerable 
(IR<3)
Vulnerable     
(IR drop >0.5)Aid in percent of GDP
Int. Reserves in Months of 
Imports of G&S
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Appendix VI. Scenarios for Financing Needs 
This appendix shows various measures of LICs’ financing needs due to the global crisis. 
The measures of the external shock and of the financing need focus on the change in balance 
of payments flows and reserves since the April 2008 WEO, in the most recent projections, 
and in a simulation of possible further shocks (see Appendix IV for details on the simulation, 
although here the combined shock does not include a shock to aid). For each case, and for all 
70 LICs in the sample, the table shows reserves in U.S. dollars and in months of (current 
year’s) imports of goods and services. The total magnitude of the shock or the financing need 
for all countries that are adversely affected is presented in the bottom part of the table.  
The setup of the appendix table differs from that of the summary table in the main text. For 
both the most recent projections, and in a simulation of possible larger shocks, the table 
shows three results: The first column of the appendix table focuses on the total reserve loss 
and the resulting additional financing need. The second column focuses on the magnitude of 
the balance of payments shock before adjustment or import compression.  
The first two columns of the appendix table show the change in 2009 reserves since the  
April 2008 WEO in U.S. dollars.  
? As indicated at the bottom of the first column, the most recent projections show 
reduced projected reserves (in dollar terms) for 35 LICs (half of the sample). 
However, the very large overall revision, by US$131 billion, is largely explained by 
just two countries: Nigeria and India. 62 percent of the decline concerns the 16 oil 
producers in the sample. For 22 LICs, reserves are projected to fall below 3 months of 
imports at end-2009—a standard, but crude, measure of reserve adequacy.43 This 
would imply a financing need of US$25 billion.  
? The second column shows the change in reserves in the combined simulation of the 
effects of a larger global downturn on exports, FDI, remittances, and food and oil 
prices.
The third and fourth columns show the corresponding changes in reserves expressed in 
months of imports of goods and services. 
The fifth and sixth columns assess the total balance of payments shock (i.e., before 
adjustment or import compression). This is computed by adding up the declines in several 
components of the balance of payments that may be considered exogenous in the short run: 
exports, FDI, remittances (measured here by current private transfers), donor grants, and the 
price effects on imports of the change in food and fuel prices. The fifth column shows the 
magnitude of these changes in the current baseline projections. The sixth column shows the 
corresponding results in the simulation. Given the assumed absence of policy adjustment in 
the simulation, the total shock equals the total reserves loss shown in the second column. 
43Also including cases where reserves fall by more than 0.5 month of imports, to less than 4 months. 
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Reserves Change in 
percent Fund quota 
Current 2009 proj. 2009 Simul. 2/ Current 2009 proj. 2009 Simul. 2/ Current 2009 proj. 2009 Simul. 2/ 2009 Simul. 2/
Afghanistan, I.R. of . . . . . . .
Albania 5 -349 0.3 -0.5 834 -349 -465
Angola -13,754 -45,258 -4.7 -16.2 -45,416 -45,258 -10,249
Armenia -49 -547 -0.2 -1.5 129 -547 -386
Azerbaijan -1,581 -31,789 -0.8 -27.3 -24,626 -31,789 -12,810
Bangladesh 432 -4,589 0.3 -1.9 3,122 -4,589 -558
Benin 39 67 -1.3 1.5 -145 67 70
Bhutan 30 -135 1.3 -1.5 -548 -135 -1,391
Bolivia 2,488 -468 3.2 -0.7 -897 -468 -177
Burkina Faso -1 -84 0.8 0.1 50 -84 -91
Burundi -69 -67 -0.7 -1.1 -15 -67 -56
Cambodia 278 -794 0.7 -1.0 -221 -794 -588
Cameroon -633 -2,196 -0.7 -3.7 -1,188 -2,196 -767
Cape Verde -181 -410 -0.6 -3.2 -519 -410 -2,769
Central African Rep. 18 -144 1.0 -3.7 -7,745 -144 -168
Chad -393 -1,789 -0.9 -5.8 -1,937 -1,789 -2,071
Comoros 7 8 -1.1 1.7 -31 8 56
Congo, Dem. Rep. of 452 -882 0.9 -1.1 -3,693 -882 -107
Congo, Republic of -2,267 -6,178 -5.3 -12.0 -2,973 -6,178 -4,735
Côte d'Ivoire -68 -1,074 0.2 -1.0 -88 -1,074 -214
Djibouti 20 -27 0.9 -0.2 -73 -27 -109
Dominica -8 -14 -0.5 -0.5 -23 -14 -112
Eritrea 125 -73 3.1 -2.2 -11 -73 -299
Ethiopia 73 -1,131 0.0 -1.5 1,182 -1,131 -548
Gambia, The 19 15 0.5 0.6 55 15 31
Georgia 540 -1,974 1.6 -2.9 -1,675 -1,974 -852
Ghana -1,002 -1,394 -1.0 -1.4 1,187 -1,394 -245
Grenada 22 -14 0.7 -0.2 -86 -14 -77
Guinea -88 -262 0.0 -1.5 177 -262 -159
Guinea-Bissau 18 -2 -1.5 0.8 41 -2 -7
Guyana 121 -170 1.0 -1.4 -34 -170 -121
Haiti 172 -498 0.6 -2.1 -308 -498 -395
Honduras -965 -1,683 -0.7 -1.7 -3,255 -1,683 -842
India -40,878 -15,610 -0.2 0.8 33,689 -15,610 -243
Kenya 283 -548 0.6 -0.2 1,896 -548 -131
Kyrgyz Republic 49 -153 0.3 -0.1 843 -153 -112
Lao People's Dem. Rep. 15 -235 0.1 -1.1 441 -235 -288
Lesotho -583 -385 -3.1 -2.3 -576 -385 -715
Liberia 67 -437 -0.1 -5.6 -23 -437 -398
Madagascar -34 -451 0.3 -1.1 -167 -451 -239
Malawi -158 174 -1.1 1.5 342 174 162
Maldives 654 130 5.8 1.4 415 130 1,031
Mali -115 -402 -0.6 -1.4 662 -402 -280
Mauritania -545 -646 -3.0 -3.6 -1,032 -646 -651
Moldova -614 -1,347 -0.7 -2.4 -145 -1,347 -709
Mongolia -539 -68 -1.8 0.3 -24 -68 -86
Mozambique -92 -933 0.2 -2.4 -891 -933 -532
Myanmar 2,090 -99 2.8 -0.1 585 -99 -25
Nepal 1,347 415 3.7 1.8 989 415 377
Nicaragua 811 -745 2.1 -1.5 -1,797 -745 -372
Niger 177 -396 0.0 -2.4 509 -396 -391
Nigeria -55,970 -55,188 -8.8 -9.4 -44,225 -55,188 -2,041
Pakistan -2,437 -2,947 -0.5 -0.4 7,490 -2,947 -185
Papua New Guinea 210 -2,451 0.9 -6.0 -820 -2,451 -1,208
Rwanda 32 -15 0.1 0.4 174 -15 -12
São Tomé & Príncipe -9 6 -2.7 1.2 13 6 53
Senegal -197 -287 -0.1 -0.3 508 -287 -115
Sierra Leone -34 -74 0.0 -0.9 41 -74 -46
Somalia . . . . . . .
Sri Lanka -1,789 -2,139 -1.4 -1.5 -1,511 -2,139 -335
St. Lucia -2 -97 -0.2 -1.5 149 -97 -412
St. Vincent & Grens. 7 -99 0.3 -2.9 8 -99 -772
Sudan -2,076 -10,397 -1.4 -9.1 -6,627 -10,397 -3,973
Tajikistan -29 122 -0.4 0.7 1,260 122 91
Tanzania 624 -961 1.5 -1.1 783 -961 -313
Togo 15 -111 0.8 -0.2 135 -111 -98
Uganda 293 45 0.7 0.5 1,063 45 16
Uzbekistan -3,369 -3,520 -8.2 -5.2 259 -3,520 -828
Vietnam 3,637 -7,752 1.5 -1.0 -10,052 -7,752 -1,527
Yemen, Republic of -142 -1,986 2.1 -0.6 -317 -1,986 -529
Zambia -151 -1,058 -0.1 -2.6 -1,217 -1,058 -140
Total balance of payment shock (billions) 3/
Total number 38 60
Total value -165 -216
Total Reserve loss (billions) 4/
Total number 35 60
Total value -131 -216
Additional financing need (billions) 5/
Total number 22 48
Total value -25 -138
1/ All changes are relative to the Spring 2008 WEO projection for 2009. See Appendix VI for details.
2/ This corresponds with the simulated combined shocks to exports, remittances, and FDI described in Section VI and Appendix V.
3/ The sum of the shocks to exports, FDI, remittances, and the price effects of food and fuel price changes (but excluding import responses).
4/ The total change in reserves for LICs with reserves losses.
5/ The total change in reserves for LICs with reserves coverage falling below 3 months of imports or reserves falling by more than 0.5 months to less than 4 months.
Sources: WEO database, and Fund staff calculations
Appendix VI. Balance of Payments Financing Needs /1
Reserves Change in millions of 
U.S. Dollars                   
Reserves Change in Months of 
Imports of Goods and Services Total Shock in millions of U.S. 
Dollars     
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